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BEYOND BLAME-MENS REA AND REGULATORY
CRIME

Arthur Leavens·

"A VEXATIOUS PROBLEM"

On the surface, the issue seems quite straightforward. Congress enacts a
criminal statute that either has no mens rea requirement or, if it has one, is
unclear about its reach. It thus falls to the courts to decide if Congress meant
for the statute to impose strict liability or to provide some level of mens rea, an
interpretive task for which courts seem to be well suited. Yet, judges continue
to be confounded by what one has called this "vexatious problem.")
In its century-long effort to provide guidance regarding this recurring issue,
the Supreme Court has only confused matters, swinging from an almost cavalier endorsement of strict liability at the beginning of the twentieth century to a
current willingness to find a mens rea element in virtually every statute without
regard to its language, purpose or history. The problem stems from the Court's
inattention to the very different role that mens rea plays in regulatory crime as
opposed to traditional crime. Traditional mens rea, a blame-based component
of common law crimes, has no role to play in regulatory crimes. For regulatory
crimes, mens rea serves a notice function which is quite distinct from that of its
blame-oriented cousin. The failure to account for this conceptual difference
has resulted in an interpretive jurisprudence that ranges from murky to incoherent.
Conventionally, mens rea is the vehicle for attributing blame and thus
suitability for criminal conviction and punishment. As such, it is conceptually
a part of crime, at least crimes meant to stigmatize and punish wrongful

• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like to thank
my colleagues and former colleagues Jamie Colburn, Anne Goldstein, Scott Howe, and Barry
Stem for their encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and
Dean Art Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2000) (Judge
Sack begins the court's opinion interpreting such a statute by observing, "We return in this
appeal to a vexatious problem.").
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conduct. As we were taught in our first year of law school, "Actus non fadt
reum nisi mens sit rea-an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is
guilty.,,2 But for well over a century, criminal law has reached beyond this traditional notion of crime to include a different genre, so-called regulatory crimes
that are intended to provide incentives for extra care among those engaged in
facially legitimate but potentially harmful activities. Because these crimes do
not have moral content and thus are not predicated on moral blameworthiness,
traditional blame-oriented mens rea has no conceptual role to play. However,
this does not mean that all regulatory crimes should be crimes of strict liability.
By requiring proof that those who may be subject to regulatory criminal statutes
understand the nature of their conduct or the circumstances in which it occurs,
mens rea can ensure constructive notice of this potential criminal liability. For
particular statutes, such notice can be the difference between acceptable hardship and unfair surprise.
The background principles are familiar. If a statute is one codifying or creating a traditional crime, that is, one that prohibits and punishes morally blameworthy conduct (as the common law was said to do), then it is black-letter law
that the crime includes a mental element, mens rea, and any omission of such
an element on the face of the statute is taken to be inadvertent. The legislature
is presumed to have intended mens rea, and it is judicially inserted into the statute absent clear legislative intent to omit it.
On the other hand, no such presumption applies if the crime is not of the
traditional sort but is instead a regulatory, public welfare crime, enacted to
protect the public rather than to punish wrongdoing. 3 As to such regulatory
crimes, many courts leave the analysis at taking the statute's omission of mens
rea at face value and interpreting the crime to be one of strict liability. But,
there is, or should be, another step, and that is to consider whether under the
principles of notice-not blame-mens rea ought to be inferred to guard

2 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 107
(William S. Hein & Co. 1986)(1644); WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., CRIMINAL
LAW 212 (2d ed. 1986).
3 This may sound like the timeworn distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita and
some have so described it. See, e.g., HenryM. Hart, Jr., The Aims ofthe Criminal Law, 23 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 419 (1958). Hart uses the distinction as descriptive shorthand in his
discussion of blameworthiness as the foundation for criminal punishment. This distinction has
long been criticized for its employment as a litmus test in deciding which crimes are ones of
strict liability and which require proof of mens rea. See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 340-41 (2d ed. 1947).
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against unfair surprise. Mens rea should not in this analysis be presumed; the
notice analysis presumption runs the other way.
In gleaning the legislature's unarticulated intent concerning notice-based
mens rea, a court should engage in the same balancing of interests that informs
other notice issues. This analysis should be prospective and general, comparing
the protective, societal needs advanced by the statute, on the one hand, with the
concern that the statute might create a "trap for the innocent,'''' on the other.
Such analysis might lead a court to conclude that the potential for unfair surprise outweighs the need for excuse-free enforcement, an imbalance that for
some statutes could be corrected by requiring proof that the actor was aware of
some aspect of the conduct in question. Inferring a mens rea element in such a
case, to serve the assumed interest of the legislature in a reasonable balance of
societal need for strict enforcement against fair warning to individuals likely
affected, would be entirely appropriate. It would not, however, be based on the
blame-based presumption of mens rea that applies in traditional crimes.

The Supreme Court has recognized and even employed, although not
explicitly, such notice-based mens rea. In a series of cases that included its
landmark decision in Lambert v. California,5 the Court moved toward an
interpretive theory utilizing notice-based mens rea. However, this emerging
construct abruptly ended with Liparota v. United States,6 a case in which the
Court ignored the distinction between notice and blame as a basis for mens rea,
reverting to the traditional but inapt presumption of blame-based mens rea to
address the notice problems of a regulatory statute. This mix-and-match
approach to mens rea remains with us today, and the result is a jurisprudence
marked by confusion and, inevitably, arbitrary decision making.
Two fairly recent circuit court cases interpreting the Federal Archaeological
Resources Protection Ace (ARPA) provide good examples of this conceptual
confusion. Enacted in 1979, ARPA was designed to protect against the
plundering of America's archaeological resources, principally Native American
artifacts in the West. 8 As is here relevant, the Act makes it a crime to
"knowingly ... excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface ... any

United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952).
5355 U.S. 225 (1957).
6471 U.S. 419 (1985).
7 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1979) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2000)).
8 125 CONGo REc. H17393 (daily ed. July 9, 1979) (statement of Rep. M. Udall) (cited in
United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Crr. 2000)).
4
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archaeological resource located on public lands . . . unless such activity is
pursuant to a [federally issued] permit.,,9 Violators may be fined up to $10,000
and/or imprisoned up to a year unless the value of the resource in question
exceeds $500, in which case the potential fme and imprisonment are doubled. 10
On its face, the statute requires proof that one charged with this crime must
have "knowingly" excavated, removed, damaged or altered some object, but
what other knowledge, if any, must be proven to convict? This is the question
to which the Ninth and Tenth Circuits respectively turned in United States v.
Lynch}} and United States v. Quarrell. 12

Lynch was first and in some sense presented the more compelling facts. Ian
Lynch was a young man who went deer hunting with two friends on an uninhabited island in southeast Alaska. \3 While exploring the island, he saw, half14
buried in the ground, what appeared to be the back of an old human skull.
Lynch picked it up, saw that it indeed was a skull, and took it home to try to
learn more about it. IS Somehow the regional Forest Service learned of his
discovery and confiscated the skull. 16 After its initial examination did not
reveal whether the skull was sufficiently old to be a protected "archaeological
resource" under ARPA, the Service sent it out for carbon dating, which showed
that the skull was some 1400 years old.17 Lynch was indicted for, and ultimately convicted of, a felony violation of ARP A.18 He defended by claiming
quite credibly that he did not know the age or the value of the skull and was
thus unaware that it was either an "archaeological resource" or valued at more
than $500. 19 Of course, for this to be a cognizable defense, the statute's
"knowingly" mens rea had to reach beyond the prohibited conduct and apply to
"archaeological resource" and to a value "exceeding $500."
Without deciding whether the crime was regulatory or traditional in nature,20 the Ninth Circuit focused its interpretive analysis on the felony penalty

9

16 U.S.C. § 470ee.

10 Id.

233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
310 F.3d 664 (lOth Cir. 2002).
13 Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1140.
14Id.
15Id.
16Id.
17 I d.
18 I d. at 1140-41.
19Id. at 1141.
20 The court observed, "Picking up a skull is not in every case 'malum in se,' nor does
every case 'involve the public welfare. '" Id. at 1143. Putting aside the fact that the statute
11

12
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involved and on the potential unfairness of its application to "casual visitors"
looking for souvenirs on public lands. 21 The court's concern that the statute
may set a trap for unwary offenders is a classic notice concern, but it is only
half of the inquiry. Full notice analysis would also ask whether in enacting the
statute Congress had identified particular threats to archaeological resources
that called for strict, excuse-free enforcement. Only then would the court be in
a position to weigh the special need for particularized warning to potential
violators against the apparent need for strict enforcement, all in an effort to
decide what Congress intended to be the reach of the statute's "knowledge"
requirement. However, the Ninth Circuit engaged in no such notice analysis.
Having identified what it believed to be the potential for unfair surprise, the
court simply stated that "the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement
should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. ,,22 The court thus addressed its notice concern through the
application of the common law, blame-based mens rea presumption, holding
that the statute required proof that Lynch knew, or should have known, that the
skull was an "archaeological resource" as a predicate to his conviction?3
That this was a notice-driven decision seems underscored by the court's
imposition of an objective limitation to the statute's "knowingly" provision,
including within its reach not only those proven to have known ofthe artifact's
character but also those who "should have known," thereby addressing enforcement concerns. This extension of "knowingly" to the archaeological character
of the object in question, limited by an objective overlay, may be the appropriate way to read the statute if all of the notice factors had been considered.
However, one is left to wonder whether, had Lynch been a back-hoe-operating
poacher at whom the legislation was aimed rather than a curious visitor to the
island, the court would have been so quick to afford a mistake-of-fact defense
through its mens rea analysis. By employing the inapt presumption of mens
rea instead of openly engaging in the appropriate notice analysis, the court
leaves us to guess at the factors that ultimately drove its decision.

prohibits more than "picking up a skull," in the end one has to decide whether the prohibition is
regulatory or traditional, given the very different mens rea presumptions that depend on that
distinction. The focus should be on the statute as a whole, not on the single act at issue in the
matter at hand. Picking up a human skull might look very different than picking up a stray
arrowhead or shard of pottery when trying to decide the nature of the prohibition which applies
equally to both.
21 Id. at 1142-46.
22 I d. at 1144.
23Id. at 1145-46.
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Quarrell,24 decided by the Tenth Circuit two years later, presents a little
different twist to interpreting this statute. In Quarrell, the issue was not
whether the statute's requirement of "knowingly" applied to whether the object
taken or disturbed was an "archaeological resource," but whether it applied to
the circumstance that the act occurred on "public land. ,,25 After determining
that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history definitively answered that question, the court turned to what was essentially notice analysis,
considering issues of both fair warning and governmental enforcement needs. 26
The court then concluded that Congress intended the "public land" element to
be primarily jurisdictional, and thus that Congress did not intend for the statute's knowledge requirement to apply to it. 27 Jurisdictional elements are ordinarily strict liability, and so it would seem that the defendant could not defend
by claiming a mistake concerning the character of the land from which he took
the artifacts. 28
This analysis is quite defensible even ifnot explicitly a notice-based construct. However, the opinion did not end there. The court went on to hold that
the defendant could nevertheless present a mistake-of-fact defense based on his
belief (1) that he was excavating on private, not public, land and (2) that he had
permission to do SO?9 In the words of the court:
After the government establishes an ARPA violation, the defendant should be
allowed to argue a mistake-of-fact defense based on his reasonable beliefthat
he was excavating on private land with permission. The defendant must establish that he reasonably believed that he was lawfully excavating on private
land because such "an honest mistake of fact would not be consistent with
criminal intent." However, if a defendant merely argues that he thought he
was excavating on private land, such a mistake of fact would not negate
criminal intent because such conduct is unlawful. 30

24 United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 2002).
25 Id. at 668.
26Id. at 670-74.
27Id. at 674.
28 See United States v. Yerrnian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-70 (1984) (holding that the statutory
terms "knowingly" and "willfully" in 18 U.S.c. § 1001 (1948) (current version at Pub. L. No.
109-248, 120 Stat. 603 (2006)), forbidding false statements to federal agents, were not intended
by Congress to apply to the element "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States" because the "primary purpose [of this element] is to identifY the
factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern").
29 Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 675.
30Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

2007-2008]

MENS REA AND REGULATORY CRIME

7

This is classic common law analysis. Having decided that the specified
mens rea requirement of "knowingly" did not apply to the element of "public
land," the court nevertheless presumed the existence of general criminal intent,
which flows from the notion that to be punished one must be proven to be
blameworthy. Under the common law, only a reasonable mistake which would,
as an objective matter, leave the actor believing that he was acting lawfully, that
is, within the shared moral code, would relieve him of that blame and thus ineligible for moral censure or punishment. 31
Both cases, then, end with the same result, although the ostensible holdings
vary, Lynch holding that "knowingly" applies to the element of "archaeological
resource,,,32 and Quarrell holding that "knowingly" does not apply to the
element of "public lands.,,33 Yet, in both the bottom line is that the defendant
can successfully defend through-but only through-a reasonable mistake concerning the element in question. If these cases and their respective analytic
flaws were anomalies, they would not be worthy of mention, but they are not.
Rather, they are representative of a more general tendency to conflate blameworthiness and notice issues. The result has been confusion at best, manipulation at worst.
The goal of this Article is to unravel this skein. In the first part, I will
briefly outline the conceptual underpinnings of the common law approach to
mens rea, with its blame focus, and the Supreme Court's early efforts to
develop a different approach in interpreting regulatory criminal statutes. The
second part begins with Lambert v. California, in which the Court staked out
the constitutional limits for the employment of strict liability in public welfare
or regulatory crimes, and, more importantly for our purposes, first employed
notice-based mens rea. 34 This part goes on to examine the ensuing cases in
which the Court, at least implicitly, fleshes out the notice analysis that should
guide the courts in deciding whether Congress intended strict liability or some
level of mens rea in enacting regulatory criminal statutes. The third part begins
with Liparota v. United States, the case in which the Court departed from the
emerging construct, which had distinguished blame-based and notice-based
mens rea. 35 This part then charts the doctrinal confusion that has resulted from
this conflation of blame and notice in the Court's mens rea analysis, confusion

See infra pp. 8-11.
United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
33 Quarrell, 310 F .3d at 664.
34
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
35 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
31

32
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that is apparent not only in its own cases but also those of the circuit courts as
they confront this "vexatious problem."
THE LIMITS OF BLAME

Any attempt to determine the limits of blame in our criminal law must
begin with the common law and its understanding that criminal punishment
was reserved for the morally blameworthy. This fusion of moral and legal
norms may seem an anathema to twenty-fIrst century lawyers, but eighteenthcentury English judges and lawyers understood "moral" as a normative concept
based on a society's secular sense of the divide between the "virtuous [and the]
criminal . . . such as is known or admitted in the general business of life. ,,36

36 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times Books, London
1979) (1755). In his authoritative, then-contemporary Dictionary of the English Language,
Johnson went on to amplify this definition of "moral" thusly:
Relating to the practice of men towards each other, as it may be virtuous or criminal,
good or bad.
Keep at least within the compass of moral actions, which have in them vice or
virtue. Hooker, b. ii.

In moral actions divine law helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide man's
life, but in the supernatural it alone guideth. Hooker, b. i.
Popular; such as is known or admitted in the general business of life.
Mathematical things are capable of the strictest demonstration; conclusions in
natural philosophy are capable of proof by an induction of experiments; things of a
moral nature by moral arguments, and matters of fact by credible testimony.
Tillotson's Sermons.
A moral universality is when the predicate agrees to the greatest part of the
particulars which are contained under the universal subject Watts's Logick.

Id.
In his influential treatise, Blackstone sounded a similar note. In writing about crimes
"against private subjects," the core of what we regard as common law crimes, Blackstone
distinguished them from purely private wrongs for which compensation could be sought:
[T]he wrongs, which we are now to treat of, are of a much more extensive
consequence; I. Because it is impossible they can be committed without a violation of
the laws of nature; of the moral as well as political rules of right: 2. Because they
include in them almost always a breach of the public peace: 3. Because by their
example and evil tendency they threaten and endanger the subversion of all civil
society. Upon these accounts it is, ... the government also calls upon the offender to
submit to public punishment for the public crime.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-77 (1765).
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When common law judges applied and thus elaborated the criminal law
through the adjudicative process, they saw themselves as doing nothing more
than giving formal recognition to behavioral norms already operative as a
matter of societal consensus. 37 Those who acted contrary to those norms were

37 So, in his treatise, The History ofthe Common Law, Sir Matthew Hale first notes that all
matters criminal "are determinable by common law, and not otherwise." 1 MATIHEW HALE,
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 64 (5th ed. 1794). Turning to "the formal constituents, as I
may call them, of the common law," Hale points to "USAGE AND CUSTOM" (relating principally
to civil and canon law), parliamentary authority (which he here limits to "those constitutions
and laws being made before time of memory, [which] do now obtain, and are taken as part of
the common law and immemorial customs of the kingdom"), and "JUDICIAL DECISIONS." Id. at
139-41. In expounding on the role ofjudges in crafting the common law, Hale is careful. He
writes:
It is true, the decisions of the courts of justice, though by virtue of the laws of this
realm they do bind, as a law between the parties thereto, as to the particular case in
question, till reversed by error or attaint; yet they do not make a law, properly so
called, for only the king and parliament can do; yet they have great weight and
authority in expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is;
especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions and
decisions of former times. And though such decisions are less than law, yet they are a
greater evidence thereof that the opinion of any private persons ....
Now judicial decisions, as far as they refer to the laws of this kingdom, are for the
matter of them of three kinds.
First, they are either such as have their reasons singly in the laws and customs of the
kingdom.... And in these things, the law or custom of the realm is the only rule and
measure to judge by; and in reference to those matters, the decisions of courts are the
conservatories and evidences of those laws.
Secondly, or they are such decisions, as by way of deduction and illation upon those
laws, are framed or deduced .... And herein the rule of decision is, first, the common
law and custom of the realm, which is the great substratum that is to be maintained;
and then authorities or decisions of former times, in the frame or the like cases; and
then the reason of the thing itself (Note p: This force of decision is called
'praeteritorum memoria eventorum. ').
Thirdly, or they are such as seem to have no other guide but the common reason of
the thing, unless the same point has been formally decided.
Id. at 142-43.
Two centuries later, in what by then may have been the beginning of a rear-guard action,
influential American commentator Joel Bishop defended the common law against the emerging
suggestion that it reflected no more than the "individual fancies" of judges. So, Bishop wrote:
But, said a learned judge, "every nation must of necessity have its common law, let it
be called by what name it may; and it will be simple or complicated in its details as
society is simple or complicated in its relations." (citing Justice Turley in Jacob v. S.
in 22 Tenn. 3 Hum. 493, 514--15 (1842) (Turley, J.)). And however some deprecate
what they term arbitrary power in judges, who decide causes upon laws not written in

10
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behaving at once immorally and unlawfully; the common law made no distinction between these two concepts. 38 One who breached such a norm was by
defmition morally blameworthy and thus merited the formal censure of criminal
conviction and punishment. 39 It naturally followed that if the actor was mistaken concerning the circumstances that made the actor's conduct immoral and
thus illegal-for example, a man mistakenly believed that his sexual partner
consented to sexual intercourse in what otherwise was a rape---he would not be
morally blameworthy, at least if his mistake was reasonable40 and the
circumstances as he believed them to be did not make his act morally blameworthy. 41 To modem ears, limiting the doctrine of mistake with reference to

the statute-books, such justice is necessary among every people, whether calling
themselves free or not.
Our tribunals commit many more errors by refusing to deal out the justice which the
general principles of our jurisprudence and the collective conscience of mankind
confessedly demand-alleging in excuse the want of a statute or a precedent-than in
all other ways combined. Not thus was it anciently, when the courts of our English
ancestors decided controversies with but few statutes and precedents to aid them;
deriving principles for their decisions from the known usages of the country, and from
what they found written by God in the breasts of men. And because it was not thus
formerly, it should not be now. For by admitted doctrine, the judges should not
decide from their individual fancies, but by the law as they find it; and we see that the
law, as judges find it, commands them to go in proper cases outside the statutes and
prior decisions, for principles on which to adjudicate the particular matter before
them.
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON ANEW SYSTEM OF
LEGAL ExposmoN 8-9 (8th ed. 1892) (internal citation omitted).
38 See supra notes 36 & 37. See also Gerhard Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42
MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1058 nn.45-46 (1958).
39 See Mueller, supra note 38, at 1058.
40 Jerome Hall noted and criticized this objective limitation to the availability of the
mistake-of-fact defense in Anglo-American criminal law. HALL, supra note 3, at 366-72. See
also Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 liARv. L. REv. 75, 83-85
(1908).
41 See, e.g., Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). Prince, of course, is the oftcited case in which the English Court for Crown Cases Reserved denied a mistake-of-fact
defense to the accused, not because his mistake was unreasonable but because his act-in the
circumstances as he mistakenly believed them to be-was morally wrong. Id. Prince had been
convicted for taking an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession of her
father, in violation of a statute forbidding such conduct. Id. Although the girl was at the time
fourteen, Prince mistakenly, reasonably so according to the jury, believed her to be eighteen,
thus, outside the reach of the statute. Id. Such a reasonable mistake offact would ordinarily
exculpate, but the court affirmed Prince's conviction on the ground that it was morally wrong,
though not forbidden under the statute, so to act. Id. Moral norms, even those not formally
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moral standards violates the concept oflegality,42 but at a time in which there
was no practical distinction between moral norms-understood as behavioral
norms supported by societal consensus-and legal rules, such absolution made
perfect sense. A mistaken actor who, because of his reasonable mistake (a mistake anyone could make), did not appreciate the normative content of his or her
conduct was not blameworthy, and thus could not fairly be subjected to condemnation and punishment for that conduct. 43

reduced to "law" by statute or judicial precedent, nevertheless marked the bounds between
criminality and lawful behavior. See also Keedy, supra note 40, at 83-84.
42 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 171 (4th ed. 2006).
43 In addressing the question of who should be punished and who should be excused for
committing an act forbidden by the criminal law, Blackstone reduces this issue to:
[T]his single consideration, the want or defect of will. ... [T]he concurrence ofthe
will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, [is] the only
thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a
complete crime cognizable by human laws there must be both a will and an act.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
Blackstone identified six defects of will that could be said to affect an actor's culpabilityinfancy, lunacy, drunkenness, misfortune or chance, ignorance or mistake, and necessity. As to
instances in which "a man commits an unlawful act by misfortune or chance, and not by
design .... [h]ere the will observes a total neutrality, and does not co-operate with the deed;
which therefore wants one main ingredient of a crime." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis in original). He
refines the point, distinguishing between "accidental mischief [that] happens to follow the
performance ofa lawful act," which excuses the actor, and the case in which "a man be doing
anything unlawful, and a consequence ensues which he did not foresee or intend, as the death of
a man or the like," which "shall be no excuse; for, being guilty of one offense, in doing
antecedently what is in itself unlawful, he is criminally guilty of whatever consequence may
follow the first misbehaviour." Id. at 26-27 (citation omitted). Turning to "ignorance or
mistake," Blackstone writes
when a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. ... [T]he deed
and the will act[] separately, [and] there is not that conjunction between them, which
is necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or mistake offact,
an not an error in point oflaw.
Id. at 27. See also 1 HALE, supra note 37, at 14-16,38-39,42.
Similarly, Bishop wrote:
If a case is really criminal, if the end sought is punishment and not the redress of a
private wrong, no circumstances can render it just, or consistent with a sound
jurisprudence, for the court or a jury to condemn the defendant unless he was guilty in
his mind. As the laws of the material world act uniformly, never knowing exceptions,
so do those of the moral world. It is never right to punish a man for walking
circumspectly in the path which appears to be laid down by the law, even though
some fact which he is unable to discover renders the appearance false .... And a court
should in all circumstances so interpret both the common law and the statutes as to
avoid this wrong.
BISHOP, supra note 37, at 164.

12
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Moral blameworthiness, the necessary, common law predicate to criminal
conviction and punishment, thus boiled down to a failure to conform one's
conduct to consensus behavioral norms in circumstances in which the average
person would understand that the behavior was wrong. 44 Since the reach of
such criminal laws was thus intuitive to judges and citizens alike, concerns
about notice and knowledge of the law were nonexistent. 45 The notion of mala
in se had meaning. 46 A sensible corollary of this approach limited this blamebased punishment to common law crimes. Moral blame had no application to

44 This moral blameworthiness was the minimum level of culpability necessary to
criminality. Many common law crimes, of course, had the added requirement of a specific
intent that must have animated the criminal act, the ordinary effect of which was to increase the
severity of the crime. So, burglary required not only a nighttime breaking and entering of a
dwelling house, but also the intent to commit a felony therein. 1 HALE, supra note 37, at 549.
Larceny required the taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another, with felonious
intent, id. at 504, felonious intent meaning the intent to convert to one's own use the goods so
taken. Id. at 508--09. Otherwise, the taking was "at most a trespass." Id
4S Henry Hart makes this point, noting that to the extent that formal criminal norms are
congruent with "community attitudes and needs ... knowledge of wrongfulness can fairly be
assumed." Hart, supra note 3, at 413. Hart goes on, "For any member of the community who
does these things without knowledge that they are criminal is blameworthy, as much for his lack
of knowledge as for his actual conduct." Id. See also Mueller, supra note 38, at 1058.
46 It is worth repeating that this approach to an actor's mens rea, his "vicious will" in
Blackstone's words, 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 21, was not purely SUbjective but was
instead a somewhat limited, objective measure of the actor's state of mind. As Professor Gerald
Leonard points out, "vicious" (or, "vitious") did not in Blackstone's time "have the modem
connotation that 'vicious' now bears, reflecting the savage malignity or cruelty of an act."
Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History ofAmerican Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine
from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 691, 713-14 (2003). Rather,
Leonard suggests that Blackstone sought only to describe a state of mind that reflected a
departure by the actor from social norms as a basis for attributing fault to the actor for indulging
his private interests "in derogation of the exacting discipline of public virtue," not some more
evil state of mind that we might associate with the word "vicious."
Similarly, in setting out what he called the "universal" requirement of culpability as a
predicate to criminal punishment, Bishop wrote "[i]t is never right to punish a man for walking
circumspectly in the path which appears to be laid down by the law, even though some fact
which he is unable to discover renders the appearance false." 1 BISHOP, supra note 37, at 164.
More broadly, our criminal law has a long tradition of departing from a purely subjective
standard of blame, even in very serious offenses. Quite beyond the effective imposition of strict
liability for felonies such as statutory rape and bigamy, defenses to homicide such as necessity,
self defense, insanity and intoxication are routinely excluded or limited in availability for
reasons of policy or expediency. See Louis Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Subsatntive
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1279-82 (1998) for an excellent discussion of this issue
and the larger question of the constitutional status of substantive criminal law.
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violations of decrees of a "rightful authority" independent of the moral code,
that is, "positive" prohibitions deemed to be mala prohibita. 47
As quaint as this construct seems today,48 its core remains with us. Crimes
are now, of course, creatures of statute, but much of our criminal law has descended from the common law. And while we are a far more heterogeneous society than was eighteenth-century England, these common law prohibitionse.g., murder, rape, arson, theft, assault-for the most part still represent the core
of our moral norms. The traditional view that such crimes have moral content
thus continues, and one who violates such norms is morally blameworthy-and
for that reason a fit subject for censure and punishment-so long as he understood, or should have understood, the circumstances that made his act criminal.
In this view, mens rea is as critical to proof of criminality as the act itself; only
through its proof can a harmful act be regarded as blameworthy.49
While eighteenth-century criminal law included utilitarian decrees prohibiting conduct that was not regarded as immoral, 50 today there are many,

47 I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 57-58. Crimes that are "malum prohibitum" are
without "moral offense, or sin" and involve no "moral guilt."
48 See HALL, supra note 3, at 338-42, and Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the

Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1570-74 (1997) for criticisms of this mala in selmalum prohibitum
distinction.
49 Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson's classic opinion in Morissette v. United States made .
this point. In affirming that federal criminal law presumed an element of mens rea, at least in
those crimes rooted in common law, Justice Jackson wrote:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
oflawas belief in freedom ofthe human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). Even a committed consequentialist such as Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously conceded that blameworthiness is a necessary predicate to criminal punishment,
stating that "a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member ofthe community would be too severe for that community to bear." OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). Much, much has been written in the fifty or so
years since Morissette about the central role of blameworthiness in American criminal law, not
the least of which has been the work of Henry Hart, Herbert Wechsler and Herbert Packer, and,
of course, the ALI's Model Penal Code that grew out of that work and the work of others. See
generally Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L.
REv. 943 (1999) for an incisive summary of that impossibly large field of scholarship. For the
modest purposes of this paper, it is enough here to say that blame lies at the heart of traditional
notions of crime and punishment.
so See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 57-58 (citing as examples of such laws "which
enjoin only positive duties ... without any intermixture of moral guilt" statutes for preserving
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many more, particularly at the federal level. With the coming of the industrial
revolution and the advent of both relatively dangerous manufacturing processes
and anonymous, mass distribution of foodstuffs and drugs, legislatures sought
to protect the public by enacting a genre of crime characterized first as "public
welfare"sl or "regulatory" crimes, later broadened to include what some have
described as "public danger" or "public menace" crimes. 52 Others have written
extensively, and often critically, about this phenomenon,s3 and I will not
duplicate that effort here. Although there is substantial variation among these
crimes, it seems fair to describe them as regulatory measures designed preemptively to avoid possible widespread harms perpetrated by persons generally
in control of potentially dangerous processes or items. Early on, these crimes
were for the most part discrete legislative efforts to prevent potential harm,s4
but increasingly they have been enacted as part of broad regulatory programs,
designed to put teeth into the regulatory effort by allowing either administrative
or criminal sanctions against the offender. 55 For example, the federal criminal
code includes or has included crimes that forbid shipping in interstate
commerce food that has been exposed to rodent contamination and thereby
game, "for exercising trades without serving an apprenticeship, for not burying the dead in
woolen, for not performing statute-work on public roads").
51 Francis Sayre, in his classic work, Public Welfare Offenses, seems to have coined this
phrase. See Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55,56 (1933).
52 See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753,
764 (2002).
53 Beginning with Sayre's measured warning that punishment without fault should be
limited to minor crimes involving little or no punishment, see Sayre, supra note 51, at 78-83,
the commentary over the past three-quarters of a century generally has been critical of this
application of the criminal law, see, e.g., HALL, supra note 3, at 345-51,374-75, sometimes
harshly so. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 422 ("It is submitted that there can be no moral
justification for [criminal punishment without fault], and that there is not, indeed, even a
rational, amoral justification."). See also Kadish, supra note 49; John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not
Guilty by Reason ofBlamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L.
REv. 1021 (1999).
54 Sayre describes and catalogs this development, see Sayre, supra note 51, at 62-67,
summarizing these early crimes as ones falling into eight categories: (1) illegal sales of
intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded
articles, (4) violations of anti narcotic acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic laws,
(7) violations of motor vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for
the safety, health or well-being of the community. Sayre, supra note 51, at 73.
55 The Federal Archaeological Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47Omm (1979) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2000», discussed supra pp. 3-7, is as good an example
as any. So, too, is the federal statute criminally punishing violations of the regulations ofthe
Interstate Commerce Commission, see 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1960) (repealed 1979), discussed
infra pp. 25-28, 36-39. See Green, supra note 48, at 1544-45 (cataloging examples of such
crimes).
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"may have been rendered injurious to health,,,56 shipping in interstate commerce any drug "that is adulterated or misbranded,,,57 possessing an unregistered "firearm" (defined in the statute as a limited class of highly
dangerous military weapons, such as automatic rifles and hand grenades),58
"structuring" cash deposits in a bank in amounts less than $10,000,59 and acting
in violation ofInterstate Commerce Commission regulations60 and in violation
of food stamp regulations. 61
Concerns about nationwide grocery chains with warehouses in which there
are mice, drug wholesalers that repackage and ship drugs (including over-thecounter drugs) with incorrect labels, persons who possess unregistered
automatic rifles, persons who break up bank deposits into smaller amounts to
avoid reporting requirements, companies or persons who ship chemicals with
incorrect labels or shippers oftoxic chemicals who do not take the safest route,
and persons who possess food stamps without federal authorization are real.
However, none of these acts seem to be "wrongful" as a matter of societal
consensus. 62 Putting aside the legal prohibition, it thus does not seem that one
who so acts is morally blameworthy and therefore properly subject to formal
condemnation and punishment. The essence of such crimes is not harm caused
but conduct--conduct that could result in widespread harm, by persons or
entities that are best positioned to reduce or eliminate that possibility of harm
through use of proper care. These crimes are purely preventive, their aim being
generally to impose a heightened duty of care on such actors and thus prevent

56

21 U.S.C. § 342 (1968) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 673 (2005».
See United States v. Park, 421 U.s. 658 (1975).
57
21 U.S.C. § 331(1941)(current version at Pub. L. No. 108-282, 118 Stat. 902 (2005».
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
58
26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1968) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2000». See United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
59
31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (1988, Supp. IV) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
323,334,335 (2001». See United States v. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
60 18 U.S.c. § 834(f) (I 958)(repealed 2004). See United States v. Int'I Minerals & Chern.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
61
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(I) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(I) (2000». See Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
62 See Hart, supra note 3, at 420; Green, supra note 48, at 1573 (quoting Hart for the
proposition that for such crimes, "'the moral standards of the community' are simply not
relevant").
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the hann or reduce the likelihood that it will occur. These are not crimes imbued with blame. 63
To be sure, ifhann actually occurs, hann that can be linked back to such
conduct, the actors may be subject to recrimination and blame. Then the conduct becomes the act of causing that hann, which may well constitute an element of a crime with moral content. For example, there may be some level of
homicide if someone dies from contaminated food or mislabeled drugs distributed by the actor, or fraud if the unauthorized possessor offood stamps cashes
them in. The so-called regulatory crime is the act, or failure to act, in particular
circumstances; actually causing the hann guarded against is not an element of
these crimes. 64 Given that blame plays no conceptual role in such purely

63 See ALAN BRUDNER, AGENCY AND WELFARE IN THE PENAL LAW, IN ACTION AND VALUE
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21, 43 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) ("Accordingly, the doctrine of
mens rea has no role to play in the theoretical account of punishment within the welfare
paradigm; it is not part of an account of the inner necessity and deservedness of punishment,
because there is here no inner necessity or deservedness to comprehend."); Kyron Huigens, The
Dead End ofDeterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARy L. REv. 943, 945 (2000) ("Fault is an
irreducibly retrospective concept, and the inveterately prospective orientation of deterrence
theory's underlying consequentialism cripples its efforts to give an adequate account of fault. ");
See a/so Green, supra note 48, at 1547 (setting out a "roadmap to moral content in the criminal
law"). Green's purpose, however, is to evaluate the moral content of violating a formal norm,
that is, whether it is immoral to violate a criminal statute. I make the different point that there is
a set of crimes-regulatory or "public welfare" in nature--that forbid conduct that is not as a
matter of consensus societal norms immoral. I do not claim that all regulatory crimes can be so
characterized---conduct which violates the Clean Water Act, to take an example, may well be
immoraI-but there are criminal laws which forbid and punish conduct which is not otherwise
wrong, and is in Sayre's words, "a new type of twentieth century regulatory measure involving
no moral delinquency." Sayre, supra note 51, at 67; Hart, supra note 3, at 420 (characterizing
such crimes as not involving the "moral standards of the community").
64 Sayre characterized this preventive approach to public protection by criminally enforcing
regulations as "wholesale" criminal enforcement, as opposed to what he called "true crimes,"
with their emphasis on individual guilt for intentional harm doing. Sayre, supra note 51, at 6869. The common law, of course, did not always require harm as an element of crime. Although
slow to "take the will for the deed," and thus to punish attempts as if successfully accomplished,
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNElT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF TIlE COMMON LAw 453-54 (5th ed. 1956),
the common law recognized the crime of attempt. See BISHOP, supra note 37, at 438-39. But
such inchoate common law crimes required proof of the specific intent to cause the attempted
harm and an act "toward the doing, sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact
intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with things trivial
and small." BISHOP, supra note 37, at 439. One may be punished at common law for
unsuccessfully attempting a harm, but the harm must itself must be a criminal wrong against
another, and the actor must have tried to do the harm and come close to success. In contrast,
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prophylactic measures, there is no call for proof of mens rea to reflect
blameworthiness.
In a series of much-criticized decisions, the Supreme Court early on recognized this distinction between traditional, common law crime and blameless
regulatory crime, holding in United States v. Balinf s that the Federal Narcotic
Act of 1914 required no proof that a seller of enumerated narcotics knew the
character of the item(s) sold66 and in United States v. Dotterweich67 that the
Federal Food and Drug Act similarly required no proof that one who was
involved in the distribution of misbranded drugs knew or should have known
that they were misbranded. 68 Whatever quarrel one may have with this
acceptance of strict liability as a basis for a criminal conviction or with the
quality of the Court's analysis,69 the basis for the Court's holdings is clear.
Both Chief Justice Taft in Balint and Justice Frankfurter in Dotterweich
recognized Congress's power to enact criminal prohibitions the purpose of
which was to advance particular regulatory interests, even if it meant
punishing "innocent," and thus blameless, persons. 70 Both recognized that this
approach was a departure from traditional common law principles in which
"scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime,,71
but held that the Due Process Clause did not forbid such imposition of criminal
regulatory crime might punish the careless grocer for distributing potentially harmful foodstuffs,
even though that was not his intent and the possibility of harm was remote and impersonal.
65
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
66 I d. at 254.
67
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
68Id. at 284-85.
69 Compare Hart, supra note 3, at 431-33 (surveying the Supreme Court's mens rea
jurisprudence through the first half of the twentieth century, Hart observes, "[f]rom beginning to
end, there is scarcely a single opinion by any member of the Court which confronts the question
in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect.") with Bilionis, supra note 46, at 1288-95
(defending the Court's much-maligned decisional line from Balint through Lambert, arguing
that, although perhaps "careless with its craft," the Court had ''valid and weighty concerns on its
mind ha[ving] everything to do with process").
70 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided."); Dotterweich:
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction
though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity
of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of
consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the
innocent public who are wholly helpless.
320 U.S. at 284-85.
71 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
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penalty without regard to blameworthiness. The limits of criminal liability
without fault were up to the legislature.
In Morissette v. United States,72 the Court provided an important qualifier,
making it clear that strict liability remained the exception and not the rule and
that statutes codifying crimes with common law roots should be presumed to
have an element of mens rea even in the absence of explicit provision for such
a term. 73 In so holding, Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, went to great
lengths to distinguish the faultless regulatory or "public welfare" offenses from
the traditional, common law offenses such as larceny, a variation of which was
there at issue. As to the latter, Jackson left little doubt as to the blameworthiness of such traditional crimes, observing that:
[T]hey are invasions of rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in
the whole community and arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is
high and, when a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony,
which, says Maitland, is " ... as bad a word as you can give to man or
thing.,,74

With blame thus at the conceptual core of such crimes, the Court held that
more than mere omission of a mens rea term from their codification was
necessary to infer legislative intent to impose liability without fault. 75 For
traditional crime, an element of mens rea is presumed.
Although it may have taken the better part of a half century for the Court to
draw the distinction between traditional crime and regulatory crime and to point
out the implications of this difference on the interpretation of criminal statutes,
at least after Morissette the conceptual importance and limits of blameworth iness were clear in the Court's interpretive work. The Court explicitly affirmed
the continuing importance of blame, and thus mens rea-the basis for
attribution of blame-as a conceptual part of traditional crime. Conversely,
these early decisions implicitly recognized that blame (and blame-based mens
rea) had no role to play in regulatory crime. What remained for the Court was
the more difficult task of identifying the appropriate role of scienter in regulatory crime, that is, the notice role of mens rea. It is to that inquiry that we
tum.

342 U.S. 246 (1952).
at 263.
74Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
75Id. at 263.
72

73/d.
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PRINCIPLES OF NOTICE

To say that "blame" has no conceptual place in regulatory crimes does not
mean that all such crimes should necessarily be ones of strict liability or that
strict liability must necessarily apply to each element of such a crime. 76 It
certainly lies with the legislature to provide an explicit scienter element which
would require proof that the accused understood the nature of her conduct and,
if the legislature wished to go further, that she intended to engage in it. Such a
mental element and its correlative mistake-of-fact defense, given the lack ofa
retributive basis for the crime, should not, however, be presumed under traditional mens rea analysis. Rather, as developed below, the reason in such offenses to require that the prosecution prove that an accused knew or should
have known the nature of her conduct is to ensure that she was adequately
warned of the possibility of criminal sanction; that is, that she had adequate
notice.
Any such notice-based mens rea would not conceptually be an element of
the crime, proof of which is necessary to show that the crime was committed.
The notice claim is rather that, in spite of the accused's commission of a crime,
the legal prohibition should not be enforced and punishment should not be
imposed because the law which the actor violated did not give adequate
warning of the potential for criminality. The judicial willingness to imply such
a notice-based scienter element in a regulatory crime should thus be subject to
the same caution which informs the judicial approach to other notice-based
defenses, like mistake oflaw and void-for-vagueness. With notice claims, the
presumption runs against, not in favor, of a mistake or ignorance defense.
The principle that the state must provide fair warning of what is prohibited,
of course, has a constitutional dimension, operating through the Ex Post Facto
and Bill of Attainder Clauses, which together require crimes to be defined prospectively and generally,77 and through the Due Process Clause, which requires

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994).
The Constitution forbids the federal government, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and the
state governments, id. § 10, cl. 1, from enacting any bill of attainder or expostJacto law. The
former consists of special legislation providing that a particular person is criminally punishable
without trial or conviction. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1867). The latter
consists of a law which retroactively criminalizes conduct and/or aggravates punishment for a
crime. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
76

77
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these prospective general commands to be relatively clear in their meaning. 78
Two interrelated concerns underlie this basic notice concept. First, individuals
who are potentially liable for criminal punishment must be able to fairly predict
what the law forbids so that they can avoid punishment if they wish. Second,law enforcement officials need clear guidance concerning the content and
purpose of the prohibitions which they must enforce in order to avoid arbitrary
enforcement. The concern in this Article is for statutes that satisfy this constitutional requirement but nevertheless might catch violators by surprise. 79 The
focus, then, is on the fair-warning aspect of notice, which some have dismissed
as a relatively unimportant or abstract concern80 but which seems resurrected at
least as a subconstitutional concern with the advent of widely applicable
regulatory statutes.
As the concerns that they address would suggest, these notice issues81 differ
markedly from those of blameworthiness. Since the purpose is to provide guidance to prospective offenders, and enforcers too, notice concerns are--or at
least should be-general and prospective rather than individualized and retrospective in their focus. While blameworthiness concerns mandate a retributive
judgment of a particular individual based on what that person chose to do, the
notice inquiry asks whether, in the context of its likely application, a criminal
prohibition gives reasonable warning of what conduct it prohibits. Answering
this notice question requires balancing society's need for the prohibition as
articulated against the general likelihood that the prohibition, so articulated,
'will either unfairly take potential violators by surprise or give rise to arbitrary
enforcement of its command.

78 See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926). See generally John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction ofPenal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv.
189 (1985).
79 Professor Jeffries points out the gap between the minimal fair-warning protection
actually provided by conventional void-for-vagueness analysis and that facially suggested by the
rhetoric of this doctrine. See Jeffries, supra note 78, at 205-12. See also Dan M. Kahan, Some
Realism About Retroactive Criminal Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 95, 99-101
(1997).
80 See DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 47; see also Jeffries, supra note 78, at 195-96
(discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine as the "operational arm oflegality"); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968). See, e.g., Connally, 269 U.S. at
390.
81 The focus ofthis article is on statutory interpretation and thus the discussion of notice
will focus on statutory clarity and availability, not ex post facto and bill of attainder issues.
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At least under traditional analysis, this notice balance favors the needs side,
presuming, though not irrebuttably, that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Criminal law , both as a deterrent and as a retributive response to wrongdoing,
requires uniform application to be effective. Allowing excuses for ignorance or
misunderstanding of a prohibition undercuts that uniformity of response, and
does so for reasons unrelated to either blame or deterrence. Moreover, recognizing a mistake-of-Iaw defense would reduce the incentive to learn what the
law prohibits, further undercutting the law's value as a deterrent. The rational
actor presupposed by a deterrence theory might well, in a close case, prefer to
act in ignorance, understanding that such ignorance may be a defense, rather
than to inquire into the law's provisions, thereby running the risk of learning
that the desired conduct is prohibited. 82 In contrast, the fairness side of the
notice balance when applied to traditional crimes seems to raise minimal
concerns. Since these crimes by and large reflect a shared behavioral, if not
moral code, the possibility seems insubstantial that an individual who commits
such a crime could legitimately claim surprise at the prospect of punishment or
that law enforcement officers could play on the law's ambiguity in order to
enforce it in an arbitrary manner. Thus, the principle that ignorance ofthe law
does not excuse runs deep in traditional criminal law, applying to both the existence of a prohibition and its meaning. 83

82 Additionally, some have argued that a claimed ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense would be
particularly difficult to overcome by proof. Unlike "mistakes of fact," which arise in external
circumstances that provide objective benchmarks against which to measure their bonafides and
reasonableness, the argument posits that asserted mistakes of law are more internal and thus
more difficult to controvert. See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 498 (R.
Campbell ed. 1875). But see HOLMES, supra note 49, at 48 (disputing this difficulty of proof
point and arguing that the law's unwillingness to allow an "ignorance of the law" defense rests
solely on the need to discourage rather than encourage such ignorance).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Int'! Minerals & Chem. Co., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971)
(holding that a statute making it a crime to knowingly violate [I.C.C.] regulations permitted
conviction even though the accused was ignorant of those regulations); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48,49-50 (1975) (upholding against a vagueness challenge conviction for cunnilingus under a
statute forbidding "crimes against nature," observing that "[e]ven trained lawyers may find it
necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with
any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid"); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson, 1., dissenting) (observing, with regard to a statute
criminalizing knowing violations ofI.C.C. regulations, "I do not suppose the Court intends to
suggest that ifpetitioner knew nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would
constitute a defense"); Rex v. Bailey, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800) (L.R.C.C.R.) (upholding
conviction even though accused was at sea both when the statute was enacted and when he
violated its prohibition); Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1836) (upholding conviction even
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The strength of the traditional presumption that the criminal law is known
is reflected in the narrow way in which traditional criminal law responds to a
claim that the meaning of a prohibition is unclear, that is, the void-forvagueness doctrine. In deciding whether a criminal statute is acceptably clear
in its command, courts have never required actual notice; the inquiry is not
retrospective, focused on the understanding of the accused. 84 The inquiry is
instead prospective, deciding whether the criminal prohibition in question is
sufficiently clear by balancing potential unfairness 85 against the apparent need
for such a provision as written. 86 In its vagueness analysis, the Supreme Court
has thus considered the nature and importance of the governmental interest advanced by the statute in question,87 the feasibility of greater precision in the

though accused was recently arrived foreigner from country where the conduct was not illegal).
See 1 AUSTIN, supra note 82, at 497-98; DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 177-78; 1 HALE, supra
note 37, at 42; HOLMES, supra note 49, at 47-48. See generally HALL, supra note 3, at 323-76
(criticizing the breadth and apparent rationale ofthe doctrine); LAP AVE & SCOTI, supra note 2,
at 90-92, 412-16; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 288-93 (2nd ed.,
Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1961) (1953); Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim
Reexamined, 17 WM. &MARvL. REv. 671, 671-84 (1976); BruceR. Grace, Note,Ignoranceof
the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1393-96 (1986); Jeffries, supra note 78, at
196-201,207-10; Livingston Hall & Selig Seligman, Mistake ofLaw & Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 641, 643-51 (1941).
84 See, e.g., Rose, 423 U.S. at 49-53; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-58 (1939). In none of these decisions,
respectively reviewing vagueness challenges to statutes forbidding "crimes against nature"
(applied to the act of cunnilingus), "willfully mak[ing] ... any noise or diversion which disturbs
or tends to disturb the peace or good order of[a] school session or class thereof," and being
"known [as] a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons," did the Supreme Court
make any reference in its notice analysis to the individual circumstances of the defendant or the
likelihood that he or she had actual notice of the meaning of the statute or ordinance in question.
See Jeffries, supra note 78, at 206-12.
85 Included in this notion ofunfaimess is the concern that the statute may be creating a trap
for the unwary by "criminaliz[ing] a broad range of apparently innocent conduct," see, e.g.,
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985), as well as setting up the possibility of
arbitrary enforcement. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invalidating
anti gang loitering ordinance because of the virtually unlimited discretion it afforded police in
determining its reach).
86 Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524-26 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) provides about as thoughtful yet concise a description of this tension
between concern for fair notice and need for broad enforcement as exists. See also Jeffries,
supra note 78, at 196-97.
87 Compare Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,341-42 (1952)
(observing that the challenged LC.C. regulation was the result oflongstanding congressional
concern for "protecting the public against the hazards involved in transporting explosives") with
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972) (observing that the
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statute's provisions,88 as well as the possibility that the statute's uncertain
provisions might be discriminatorily applied,89 or have an adverse impact on
fundamental rights. 9o When analyzing vagueness claims aimed at statutes
codifying traditional crimes, the Court has tolerated considerable ambiguity,
relying on the common law origins of these prohibitions and their longstanding
and continuing utilization in holding that their terms are acceptably clear. 91
Even here, the Court's tolerance for lack of clarity has limits, and the Court has
thus struck down vagrancy laws when faced with considerable evidence of their
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 92 However, absent a compelling
showing that an apparently vague traditional crime is unfair or arbitrarily enforced, the Court seems comfortable with the presumption that the command of
crimes rooted in the common law is understood.
This presumed knowledge of the criminal law is more problematic when
applied to regulatory crime. If the question is whether the accused knew that
Elizabethian social conditions which gave rise to vagrancy laws such as the ordinance there in
question "no longer fit the facts").
88 Compare United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,7-8 (1947) (stating "[c]learer and more
precise language might have been framed by Congress to express what it meant by 'number of
employees needed.' But none occurs to us ... effectively to carry out what appears to have
been the congressional purpose.") with Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393-95
(1926) (noting, in holding "current rate of wages" unduly vague as a criminal mandate, that "the
vice ofthe statute here lies in the impossibility of ascertaining, by any reasonable test, that the
legislature meant one thing rather than another ....").
89 Compare Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355-58 (1983) (striking down as
unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring loiterers and wanderers to provide "credible and
reliable" identification on demand of the police, noting that a person stopped under the statute is
entitled to continue to walk the public streets "only at the whim of any police officer who
happens to stop that individual .... ") with Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108,113 (upholding ordinance
forbidding the making of noise which ''tends to disturb the peace or good order of [a] school
session," noting that the "antinoise ordinance does not permit punishment for the expression of
an unpopular point of view, and it contains no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory
enforcement").
90 Compare Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 n.lO (1974) (observing, in striking
down statute punishing one who ''treats contemptuously the flag of the United States," that
when a prohibition "is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts") with Rose v. Locke,
423 U.S. 48, 50 n.3 (1975)(observing, in upholding statute forbidding "crimes against nature,"
that "[t]his is not a case in which the statute threatens a fundamental right such as freedom of
speech so as to call for any special judicial scrutiny" (citation omitted)).
91 See, e.g., Rose, 423 U.S. at 50--53, discussed supra notes 83, 84 & 90.
92 See Papachristou, 405 U.s. at 158-61, 169 n.15. See also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 35557. Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,60-63 (1999) (invalidating anti gang loitering
ordinance because of the virtually unlimited discretion it afforded police in determining its
reach).
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the regulatory crime existed, this presumption of knowledge has raised few
problems, given that with very few exceptions modem laws, ordinances and
regulations which provide for criminal sanctions are published.93 However, the
meaning and application of such regulatory crimes present more compelling
notice issues, and virtually from the beginning of their widespread enactment,
they were challenged as unduly vague.
The claim was that in criminalizing the violation of regulations, many of
which couched their mandates in such relative terms as "unjust or unlaIr ... and ...
reasonable, "94,,usuaI ,"95,,pract'lcable an d '" ~leaSI'ble, ,,96 an d"~'
normal,,,97 Congress enacted a standard of criminality that was too indefinite.
In responding to these vagueness claims, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the balance between fairness to those likely subject to these laws and the
need to prevent the harms at which they were aimed. When the Court upheld
such statutes, for the most part it relied either on the inclusion in the statute of
terms with accepted common law meaning or on the rules' application to
entities engaged in specialized activities. 98 Given such a basis for under-

See LAFAVE & SCOlT, supra note 2, at 416, for a concise discussion of this issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921). In Cohen
Grocery, defendant's argument was couched as a violation of its right to be informed of "the
nature and cause of the accusation" under the Sixth Amendment, but the claim was essentially
one of statutory vagueness and was so treated by the Court. Id
95 See, e.g., Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918).
96 See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,338-39 (1952).
97 See, e.g., Int'1 Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-24 (1914).
98 See, e.g., Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 346, 348 (in upholding against a vagueness
challenge a statute criminally forbidding sheep to graze "upon any range usually occupied by
any cattle grower," the Court observed that "[m]en familiar with range conditions and desirous
of observing the law will have little difficulty in determining what is prohibited by it.");
Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (noting, in upholding against a
vagueness challenge a statute criminally punishing the failure to label or mislabeling of kosher
meat, that "the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclusion that the term 'kosher' has a
meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it, at least as
a general thing"). See a/so, Connallyv. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The Court in
Connally summarized the vagueness approach thusly:
The precise point of differentiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but it
will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of the court,
upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they
employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough
known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them or a well-settled
common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to
which estimates might differ, or, as broadly stated by Mr. Chief Justice White in
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., that, for reasons found to result either from the
93

94
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standing, either through the language of the common law or through tenns with
meaning to those choosing to participate in the regulated activity,99 the Court
reasoned that the lack of certainty in the regulatory tenns was not unfair to
those regulated. lOo Central to this constructive notice analysis, of course, was
the obvious but not clearly articulated premise that the persons subject to such
criminal laws appreciated the nature of their conduct, that they knew they were
engaging in a particular field of activity. Indeed, the Court in these decisions
took particular note if the statute which criminalized violation of a regulation
required that the violation be "knowing"IOI or in some manner intentional. 102 It
was careful, however, to be clear that in this notice analysis it was not reading
the statutes to require proof that the law was actually known. 103 Such a reading
would run afoul of the ignorance-of-the-law principle.
A good example is Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 104 decided the
same year as Morissette. If in Morissette the Court made plain its continuing
fidelity to blame-based mens rea as a presumptive component of traditional
crimes, in Boyce the Court reaffinned its commitment to the opposite presumption regarding knowledge of the law, even in the face ofa relatively compelling void-for-vagueness, fair notice claim arising out ofa regulatory crime.
In doing so, the Court laid the groundwork for scienter as an instrument of
notice.
Defendant Boyce Motor Lines was a trucking company indicted for
knowingly violating an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring
that truckers hauling dangerous cargo such as explosives "avoid, so far as
text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some
sort was afforded.
Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
99 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 341-42 (noting that the trucking industry, which was
subject to the regulations in question, had "participated extensively" in their formulation and
drafting).
100 See, e.g., Omaecheva"ia, 246 U.S. at 346, 348 (holding that persons "familiar with
range conditions" would have sufficient notice as to what is meant by "range usually occupied
by any cattle grower"); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1913) (holding that the
"common law as to the restraint of trade" was incorporated into, thereby helping to narrow and
clarify, the Sherman Act's criminal provisions).
101 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 342.
102 See, e.g., Hygrade, 266 U.S. at SOl (1925) (rejecting vagueness challenge to a statute
forbidding fraudulent sale of non-kosher meat as "kosher," noting that any uncertainty in the
term "kosher" casts no unfair burden on meat sellers "since [the statutes] expressly require that
any representation that a product is kosher must not only be false but made with intent to
defraud").
103 See, e.g., Boyce, 342 U.S. at 342 n.15.
104 342 U.S. 337.
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practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or
through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car
tracks, tunnels, viaducts,.and dangerous crossings.,,105 Boyce's drivers on three
occasions had driven loads of explosives from upstate New York to Brooklyn
via the Holland Tunnel, in which the last of these trips terminated with an
explosion. The defendant trucking company argued that the regulation had no
ascertainable meaning, at least in the context of driving explosives into
Brooklyn, located as it is on Long Island. In rejecting that claim, the Court
looked to the criminal statute's knowledge requirement, observing that, to convict, the government would not only have to prove there was a practicable safer
route than that driven, but also that the trucking company either (1) knew of
that safer alternative and deliberately chose the tunnel or (2) "willfully
neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an alternative route. ,,106
Although the Court was not explicit as to why this knowledge requirement
should matter, its relevance in answering a vagueness claim is apparent, and it
says much about the Court's approach to notice and the relationship of that
approach to the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. Certainly, proof that the accused trucking company knew the specific violative character of its act, i.e.,
that there was a practicable safer route which it deliberately declined to take,
would undercut an argument that the trucking company was unfairly surprised
when the regulation was interpreted to forbid driving the more dangerous route.
This point is straightforward; the act itself, the character of which the accused
knew, bespeaks its potential criminality. However, the analysis is less straightforward if the prosecution seeks to prove a knowing violation of the regulation
by showing that the defendant willfully neglected a duty imposed by that regulation. In such a case, it would seem that ignorance of the duty "willfully
neglected"-a duty imposed by the crirninallaw-would be a defense; that is,
that ignorance of the law would excuse. 107
But there is another way to read the Court's reference to a trucking company's "duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an

!d. at 339.
Id. at 342.
107 Justice Jackson made this point in his dissent, an argument which the Court sought to
counter in a footnote by pointing out that "[t]he officers, agents, and employees of every motor
carrier concerned with the transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles are required
[by I.C.C. regulations] to 'become conversant' with this and other regulations applying to such
transportation." Id. at 342 n.IS.
105

106
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alternative route,,,108 and that is to see that duty as the formal recognition of a
norm in the industry. Any trucker hauling explosives in interstate commerce
should know the safest routes and the duty to use those routes, not because the
criminal law or I.C.C. regulations require it, but because as an empirical and
normative matter it is part of trucking to know the safest route for hauling
explosives. Thus, in the same way that a trucking company that knew of a safer
route and deliberately avoided it must---empirically and normatively-understand the possible criminality of its act, so too for the trucking company who
did not bother to see if there was a safer route. Both trucking companies, by
nature of their specialized activity, were on notice that their conduct verged on
criminal, and neither could complain that the regulation was not crystal clear in
its prohibition.
The Court's constructive notice analysis in Boyce says much about the
strength of the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle even with regulatory crimes. It
would have been a more straightforward response to the vagueness argument if
the Court had read the statute to require the government to prove that an accused was aware of the regulation and its meaning. 109 Certainly the wording of
the statute imposing criminal penalties was amenable to such an interpretation,
providing that "[w]hoever knowingly violates any [pertinent I.C.C.] regulation
shall be [fined and/or imprisoned]."lIO But as Justice Jackson said in his dissent, "I do not suppose the Court intends to suggest that if petitioner knew
nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a
defense."lll Rather, the Court read "knowingly violates any such regulation" to
mean that the prosecutor must prove the accused knew the facts which
constituted the violation-knew the character of his conduct-not the law
which prohibits that act. ll2
That was the way such language in the past had been read, 113 that is, consistent with the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. In such specialized contexts, where knowledge of "the rules" is fairly attributable to those
regulated, the principle makes sense. The notice provided by the actor's conduct is sufficient to give warning of its potential criminality, even for "regulatory crimes," and as long as the actor is at some level aware of the nature of

Id. at 342.
This, indeed, is the reading which Justice Jackson in his dissent accused the majority of
adopting. See id. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
II0Id. at 339 n.3 (majority opinion).
III Id. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 342 (majority opinion), 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 345.
108

109
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that conduct, sufficient notice of the prohibition follows. Where, however, the
accused could not be said to be aware of the nature of his conduct, at least insofar as it relates to the criminal regulation, fair warning becomes a real issue,
not just concerning the meaning of a regulatory crime's provisions but ultimately concerning its very existence. Such circumstances are surely rare, but
the Court found them in Lambert v. California, I 14 the one case in which the
Court held that due process required proof of the defendant's actual notice of
the criminal prohibition as a predicate to her conviction.
LAMBERT - THE EMERGENCE OF NOTICE-BASED MENS REA

In Lambert, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Virginia Lambert for failing to comply with a Los Angeles city ordinance that required any
person with a prior felony conviction to register with the police if present in
Los Angeles for a period of more than five days. Ms. Lambert, a seven-year
resident of Los Angeles, concededly had a prior felony conviction and had not
registered as required by the ordinance. I IS Her defense was not that the ordinance was too vague to understand but that she was completely unaware of it
and its requirement that she register-an ignorance-of-Iaw defense which the
trial court summarily rejected. 116 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding that, in the circumstances presented by that case, due process required
proof that Ms. Lambert had actual knowledge of her duty to register before she
could be convicted. 117

Although the basis for and limits of its holding are anything but clear, 118 the
Court appeared to rely on three circumstances in reaching its conclusion that

114

355 U.S. 225 (1957).

lIS

/d. at 226.

116Id. at 227.
117 Id. at 229-30.
118 For a sampling of commentator reaction to Lambert, see, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 42,
at 184-86 (focusing on the Court's concern that "there was nothing to alert Ms. Lambert or a
reasonable person to the need to inquire into the law"); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 424-25 (2000) (analyzing Lambert as a mistake-of-law case in which, because
the statute punished conduct which did not carry with it notice of criminality, knowledge of the
law was required); HALL, supra note 3, at 355-56, 404 (suggesting that in certain petty offenses
which would otherwise be strict liability and for which normal moral or cultural understandings
do not provide adequate notice, Lambert holds that "knowledge of the law is essential to
culpability; hence the doctrine of ignorantia juris should not be applied there"); LAP AVE &
SCOTT, supra note 2, at 208 (focusing on the omission aspect of Lambert, reading the case to
require knowledge of the legal duty to act only in "omissions involving duties of a highly
unusual and unforeseeable nature" and not in "all other [omission] cases"); WILLIAMS, supra
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knowledge of the law was constitutionally required: (1) that Ms. Lambert's
conduct was "wholly passive-mere failure to register[;],,119 (2) that "circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration
were completely lacking[;],,120 and (3) that unlike the typical registration statute, which is part of a regulatory scheme applicable to some sort of business,
"th[is] ordinance is but a law enforcement technique designed for the
convenience oflaw enforcement agencies .... ,,121 The Court used the rhetoric
of both fair notice and blameworthiness---observing that such circumstances
combined to deny Ms. Lambert "an opportunity either to avoid the
consequences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it,,122 and,
quoting Holmes, that "[a] law which punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for
that community to bear,,123-in holding that knowledge of the law must be
proved before a conviction consistent with due process could be had.
The case is usually cited as an example, admittedly rare, of the constitutionallimits of the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. 124 So viewed, however, its

note 83, at 46--47 (citing Lambert as representing "the acceptance by an eminent court of the
principle that a person cannot justly be punished for an omission in breach of regulation in the
absence of all fault"); Cass, supra note 83, at 679-80 (viewing Lambert as an example ofthe
Court's unwillingness to extend strict liability to non-regulatory criminal statutes); Grace, supra
note 83, at 1405 n.69 (characterizing Lambert as a due process/notice case); Hart, supra note 3,
at 433-34 (characterizing Lambert as an important, if opaque, reawakening by the Court to the
central importance of mens rea as a criterion of criminality); Jeffries, supra note 78, at 211 &
n.60 (recognizing the ambiguity of Lambert's holding but suggesting that its teaching is that
"[p]unishment for conduct the average citizen would have had no reason to avoid is unfair and
constitutionally impermissible"); Mueller, supra note 38, at 1104 (celebrating, prematurely as it
turns out, Lambert as the Court's signal that "[ a]bsolute criminal liability is beginning to end in
America"); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 107, 1273 7 (discussing the Court's lack of clarity as well as missed opportunity in addressing important
constitutional questions concerning mens rea and notice).
119 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
120 I d. at 229.
121Id.
122Id.
123 Id. Forecasting its later blurring of blame and notice, or perhaps continuing this
analytic imprecision, see Packer, supra note 118, at 133, the Court went on to identify the
severity thus imposed as "the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the consequences of the
law or to defend any prosecution brought under it." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
124 See sources cited supra note 118. See, e.g., United States v. Menteer, 350 F.3d 767,
772 (8th Cir. 2003) (characterizing Lambert as the application of "a narrow exception to the
general maxim 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,'" grounded in "the defendant's wholly
passive conduct .... "); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting
"that' [t]he sweep of the Lambert case has been limited by subsequent decisions of the Supreme
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limits are not apparent. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in a forceful dissent,
the Court's heavy reliance on the passive nature of Ms. Lambert's conduct
would seem to call into question the constitutionality of applying the ignoranceof-the-Iaw principle to many, ifnot all, crimes which punish failures to comply
with statutory or regulatory obligations. Although the Court explicitly stated
that it was not suggesting that ignorance of the law was a constitutionally
required excuse in registration statutes which "pertain to the regulation of business activities,,,125 its assertion that this statute "is entirely different [because its
violation] is unaccompanied by any activity whatever .... ,,126 is elusive as a
constitutional boundary between valid and invalid applications of the
ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle.
The problem is not with the Court's conclusion that convicting Ms. Lambert absent proof of her awareness of her statutory duty to register violates due
process-it surely does. As a conceptual matter, however, the case is less about
the constitutional limits of punishing someone unaware of the criminal prohibition than it is about the due process limits on punishing a person who has
no awareness, constructive or actual, of the nature or character of her conduct.
The unique situation which Lambert addresses is the one at which the
notice aspects of choosing to engage in conduct of a particular character and of
choosing to break: the law intersect. As noted above, mens rea, or more
accurately an actor's awareness of the nature of her conduct which mens rea
requires, has a notice dimension. Blame, as developed above, is attributable to
an actor for two reasons: (1) the evil nature of the conduct and (2) her choice, at
some level, to engage in such conduct. Any requirement that mens rea be
proven as the vehicle by which blame is attributed to an actor for her conduct
carries with it a guarantee that the actor has elected to some extent to engage in
conduct which is antisocial. Those crimes without a mens rea requirement,
public welfare or regulatory crimes, typically occur in a highly regulated context, and the actor's choice to engage in that field of conduct carries a similar
guarantee. Either way, the choice to act provides a fundamental baseline of
notice without which punishment for conduct is unacceptable. So much seems
required by the free-will basis of criminal punishment, whether primarily
utilitarian or retributivist in perspective. 127 Similar concerns seem to underlie
the fundamental requirement of a voluntary act as a prerequisite to criminal

Court, lest it swallow the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse"') (quoting United
States v. Giles, 640 F.2d 621,628 (5th Cir. 1981)).
125 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
126Id.
127

See discussion supra pp. 12-16,19-21.
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punishment. '28 There is, however, a conceptual difficulty with characterizing a
failure to act as chosen conduct unless we have some sense that the "actor"
understands, constructively or actually, she has a duty to so act. To be sure, at
the time of such a failure to take a particular course of action, the "actor"
presumably is engaging in some course of chosen conduct which does not include the required action. However, it is difficult to say, absent her appreciation of at least the possibility that she should be doing some particular
thing, that her failure to do it is in any meaningful sense chosen.
That does not mean that every criminal omission requires proof that the
"actor" knew of the duty to act before we can characterize her conduct as
chosen for constitutional purposes. In most such cases we can fairly presume
such awareness. Where the statutory duty to act is tied to some specialized or
focused activity in which a person is engaged, as in Boyce, it is not unfair or
violative of our fundamental notions of choice as a basis for criminal
punishment to charge her with constructive knowledge ofthat duty and then to
punish her failure to comply as a chosen act, even if she did not actually know
of the duty. Her choice to engage in the related, and often closely regulated,
field of activity is enough to satisfy this basic requirement of chosen conduct. 129

128 While this core predicate to criminal liability has been the subject of renewed interest
and thoughtful analysis, see, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND ITS iMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993); Mueller, supra note 38, at 1104
(celebrating, prematurely as it turns out, Lambert as the Court's signal that "[a]bsolute criminal
liability is beginning to end in America"); Ron Shapira, Structural Flaws ofthe "Willed Bodily
Movement" Theory of Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 349 (1998); A.P. Simester, On the SoCalled Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 403 (1998). Symposium, On
the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1443 (1994). Professor
Dressler makes the point succinctly: "Criminal punishment, with its attendant pain, stigma and
formal condemnation ofthe offender, should only be imposed on those who deserve it, i.e., on
those who act as the result offree choice. In the absence ofa voluntary act, there is no basis for
social censure." DRESSLER, supra note 42, at 99.
129 In a similar vein, omission cases in which the duty to act arises from the "actor's" status
and the criminal liability is based on her failure to prevent a criminal harm to another, as in the
case ofthe parent who fails to care for her child with the result that the child dies, presents no
problem of notice even absent a showing ofactual awareness of the duty to act. The offending
parent will not be permitted to defend the ensuing homicide charge on the basis that she was
ignorant of her legal duty to care for the child. Such cases, properly understood, are not
omission cases at all. Rather, in the example above, the parent is being punished for causing the
prohibited harm because her course of conduct as a parent expectably includes, from both a
normative and empirical perspective, protecting the child from that harm. When her parenting
results not in protection but in death, then she is criminally punishable under the homicide
prohibition for causing it. See Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions,
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The same cannot be said for Ms. Lambert or others subject to a statutorily
imposed duty to act which bears no relationship either to basic societal norms
of conduct or to a specialized field of activity in which she chose to engage and
about which she presumably had some particularized knowledge. Absent such
a connection between "actor" and duty to act, it is impossible to fairly say that
her failure to comply with the duty was in any sense chosen unless some actual
awareness of the duty is shown. The duty, then, becomes a conceptual part of
the conduct, and the actor's awareness of that duty is necessary to a finding that
the punishable conduct was "chosen.,,\30
This is the analytic thread which connects the three factors noted by Justice
Douglas in Lambert and which at the same time limits the due process principle
which the Court articulates. The ordinance in Lambert was entirely different
from registration statutes that are part of a regulatory scheme applicable to a
business because the latter statutes impose duties of registration on persons or
entities engaged in specialized activities connected to the duty of registration. 131
Such persons presumably have, or ought to have, some awareness of those
duties. The Los Angeles ordinance applied to Ms. Lambert had no such connection to her or to anyone to whom it might be applied. Rather, it was a tool
of police convenience. In the absence of such a connection between the duty
and the persons subject to it, Ms. Lambert's failure to register was, as the Court
76 CAL. L. REv. 547, 572-77 (1988). But even if we characterize such cases as omission cases
in which the failure to act is punishable because ofa violation of the legal duty ofa parent to
care for her child, presuming an awareness of that duty on the part of a parent does not offend
basic notions of fair notice. Quite simply, a parent ought, again both normatively and empirically, to appreciate that she is responsible for the basic welfare of her child.
130 See Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958).
Although
Professor Hughes does not characterize duty as a part of "omissive conduct" for purposes of the
voluntariness inquiry, he does point out the importance of the actor's awareness of statutorily
imposed duties to the question of whether punishment can be fairly imposed for their violation.
Id. at 601-11. See also LAYAVE & Scon, supra note 2, at 208.
\3J For example, persons engaged in buying, handling or transporting grain for sale in
foreign commerce must register with the Secretary of Commerce, 7 U.S.C. § 87f-l(a) (1976),
amended by Pub. L. No.1 03-354, § 293(a)(7) (1994); certain pesticides must be registered with
the Environmental Protection Agency in order to be sold in the United States, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)
(1972), amended by 7 U.S.c. § 136(a) (2004); persons engaged in businesses or trades on which
a special tax is imposed must register with the Secretary of the Treasury, 26 U.S.C. § 7011
(1954), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1976); facilities engaged in manufacturing, processing,
packing or holding food for consumption in the United States must register with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 21 U.S.C. § 350(d) (2002); certain investment companies are
required to register with the Security and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1960),
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-52 (1970); persons who manufacture or distribute controlled
substances must register with the Attorney General, 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1970), amended by Pub.L.
No. 103-200, § 3(b)(1) (1993).
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stated, "wholly passive .... It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to
act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his
deed.,,132 Although the Court did not speak explicitly in terms oflack of "conduct notice," that is conceptually what the Court's use of the term "passive"
implicates. So seen, the Court's holding that Ms. Lambert's knowledge of the
legal duty must be proven before she may be convicted is important not simply
as a due process limit on the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle, but more fully as a
conceptual means of ensuring that her conduct of omitting to act satisfied the
fundamental notice requirement that it in some sense be chosen.

Lambert, then, is not in derogation of the presumption that the criminal law
is known. It is rather a part of the Supreme Court's constructive notice
approach to notice problems presented by non-traditional crimes, an approach
which goes to great length to preserve the presumption that the criminal law is
known and its correlative principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse.
Such constructive notice depends, of course, on actors' awareness of the conduct in which they are engaging. When the conduct from which notice flows is
a broad activity, such as trucking in Boyce I33 or retailing kosher meats in
Hygrade Provision CO.,134 mens rea is not implicated. However, when the
notice flows from the particular conduct being punished, such as stealing or
converting government shell casings in Morissette,135 this constructive notice
depends on the actors' awareness of the nature of their conduct. Such
awareness, in tum, is assured by the requirement that mens rea be proved as the
blameworthiness element of the crime.
This overlap of blame and notice in the mens rea requirement causes no
tension in traditional crime. Blame is an intrinsic part of these crimes, and
mens rea is presumed to exist even if the legislative enactment of the crime
does not provide for it. Constructive notice thus automatically flows, and the
presumed knowledge of the law and its correlative principle that ignorance of it
does not excuse causes no rub. However, nontraditional regulatory crimes do
not necessarily impart blame, and thus mens rea is not presumptively a part of
those crimes. If a legislature is concerned about providing for notice beyond
the modest constitutional baseline implicit in Lambert, it can do so in two ways.
It can provide for actual notice, that is, that knowledge of the law must be
proven and thus that ignorance of the law is an excuse. Alternatively, a legi-

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
\34 Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925).
\3S Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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slature can provide for constructive notice, requiring proof that the actor had
some specified level of awareness concerning the nature of her conduct and its
circumstances, thus providing assurance that she should have understood that
she "sail[ed] close to the shore of questionable conduct.,,136
Fidelity to the above-outlined paradigm, in which courts presume
legislatures operate, dictates that such legislative intent to provide for actual notice-i.e., for a mistake-of-law defense-must be manifest. Legislative silence
or even ambiguity concerning a mistake-of-law defense points away from, not
toward, such a requirement of actual notice. The question of when a legislature
can be said to have intended to provide for constructive notice through a noticebased scienter element is more difficult as a practical matter, although the
conceptual guidelines are relatively clear. Statutory silence concerning such
notice-based mens rea is not entitled to the presumption of mens rea accorded
traditional crimes. By definition there is no blame to support such a presumed
scienter requirement, and thus more is needed. The question is what.
In the two decades following Lambert, the Supreme Court fleshed out, if
somewhat unevenly, this limited but important role of scienter in addressing
notice concerns with respect to regulatory crimes. The conceptual distinction in
these opinions between blame and notice as a basis for scienter remained firm,
even if the Court's rhetoric was occasionally somewhat more loose.
FREED, INTERNATIONAL MINERALS, PARK AND GYPSUM-FLESHING OUT
NOTICE-BASED MENS REA

After thirteen years of silence on the issue of scienter in regulatory crimes,
in 1971, the Court decided two important cases, United States v. Freed,137
involving a mistake-of-fact defense, and United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical COrp.,138 involving an ignorance-of-the-law defense.
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in each, and, although his opinions were
less clear than one might have wished, in each he adhered to the doctrinal
construct which distinguished between notice and blame as a basis for
interpreting scienter provisions.
In Freed, defendant was charged with possessing hand grenades in violation of the National Firearms Act, which by its terms required that specified,
mostly military weaponry, including hand grenades, be registered in the

136
137
138

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 525 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
401 U.S. 601 (1971).
402 U.S. 558 (1971).
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National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record 139 and made it unlawful for
a person "to receive or possess [such a weapon] which is not registered to
him.,,'40 Although the Act did not explicitly require proof of any intent or
knowledge, Freed claimed that the government was required not only to prove
that he knowingly possessed the weapon but also that he knew that it was not
.
d to h·1m. 141
reg1stere
In addressing Freed's claim that an implicit knowledge requirement should
apply to the element of nonregistration, 142 Justice Douglas began by noting the
difference between statutory silence concerning mens rea in a prohibition with
common law roots and one "in the expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety and welfare.,,'43 While the former carried
with it "[t]he presence of a 'vicious will' or mens rea," the latter "was in a
different category."I44 Within this nontraditional category of crimes, Douglas
made a further distinction. At one extreme he put cases such as Lambert, in
which the prohibition punished acts that by their nature or the circumstances in
which they occurred could not be said to "alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed.,,'45 In such cases, knowledge of the act's nature, which in Lambert
translated to knowledge of the duty to act, must be proven in order to assure the
minimal notice required by due process. Freed did not, in Douglas's view,
present such a case. Rather it was in that category of regulatory crimes which,
like adulterating or misbranding drugs or selling narcotics, punish violators

139 Freed, 401 U.S. at 603 n.3 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1968) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 5812 (2000))).
140Id. at 607 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1968) (invalidated by United States v. Vest, 448
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (S.D. Ill. 2006))).
141 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
142 The focus of the case was on the registration element. Although as noted the Act
contained no term of intent or knowledge, the government accepted that the statute required
proof that an accused knew that he possessed a firearm before he could be convicted. Id. at 607.
The case thus proceeded on the unexamined assumption that the government had to prove that
Freed knowingly possessed the items in question and that he knew they were hand grenades. Id.
at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). The precise content of that knowledge requirement was not at
all clear. Did the Act require proof that an accused knew he possessed a generic firearm, that is
some kind of weapon, or that he knew he possessed a firearm which had the characteristics
bringing it under the Act's registration requirement? This issue, which was the crux of Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), discussed infra at pp. 58-66, was not important in Freed
because the hand grenades which Freed was charged with possessing were plainly recognizable
as such.
143Id. at 607-08.
144 Id. at 607.
145Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
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"though consciousness of wrongdoing be totallywanting.,,146 Lack of mens rea
in such cases was acceptable in Justice Douglas's view because the character of
the prohibited conduct carried with it adequate notice of potential criminality
and thus no further mens rea requirement need be inferred. That Justice
Douglas, and the Court, was premising its mens rea analysis for regulatory
crimes on notice concerns is plain from his words:
The present case is in the category neither of Lambert nor Morissette, but is
closer to Dotterweich. This is a regulatory measure in the interest of the
public safety, which may well be premised on the theory that one would
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act. They are highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous
than the narcotics involved in United States v. Balint, where a defendant was
convicted of sale of narcotics against his claim that he did not know the drugs
were covered by a federal act. 147

The Court accordingly held that no knowledge should be inferred in the
absence of an explicit statutory requirement of knowledge applicable to the
element that the hand grenades were unregistered. Although Justice Douglas
was characteristically offhand in his analysis, the basis for the holding falls
right in line with the blame/notice distinction developed above. He reasoned in
essence that the common law presumption of such mens rea was not applicable
to this crime and notice concerns neither required nor suggested such a mens
rea tenn for this statute.
While Freed was a mistake-of-fact case, thereby at least facially subject to
the traditional blame paradigm with its presumption of mens rea, 148

146Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,284 (1943)).
147Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
148 The fact, or attendant circumstance, about which Freed was assertedly mistaken was that
the grenades were not registered under the National Firearms Act. Id. at 605. Freed's ignorance
of their nonregistration was not ignorance "ofthe law," notwithstanding the fact that it was the
Act which required their registration in the first place. Id. at 606. His claim was not that he was
ignorant of the law's command to him-that he not possess an unregistered firearm. Such
ignorance of the law defining the offense could not excuse, at least absent an explicit provision
providing for such a defense. Id. Rather, his potential claim was that he did not know that the
grenades had the characteristics of being unregistered, an intrinsic albeit legal characteristic of
the grenades which he as a possessor was powerless to alter given that the statute required the
grenades' registration before he possessed them. Id. Because the mistake which he argued the
government must disprove was one "offact," Freed did not run headlong into the ignorance of
the law is no excuse principle. Id.
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International Minerals l49 involved an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. International Minerals and Chemical Corporation was charged by information with
shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate commerce without indicating on the shipping papers that what it was shipping was a "corrosive liquid"
in violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation requiring such
labeling.lso Congress, by statute, had authorized the I.C.C. to formulate such
regulations to safeguard the transportation of dangerous liquids,ISI and provided that anyone who "knowingly violates any such regulation" was subject to
imprisonment or a fine. 152 Defendant argued that the language of the statute"knowingly violates any such 'regulation"-explicitly provided for an
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. The Supreme Court disagreed, a decision that
underscored the continuing, post-Lambert viability of the traditional presumption that the law is known to all. 153
Defendant's argument had appeal. Although ignorance of the law is
ordinarily not a defense, Congress can override that presumption and require
proof of a violator's knowledge of the law as an element of the offense. By
providing that whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation," the argument
went, that is exactly what Congress intended to dO. IS4

United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
Id. at 559 (noting 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 (1960».
151 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1964) (repealed 1979».
IS2Id. (citing § 834(f).
IS3Id. at 565.
154 While there are certainly parallels between International Minerals and Boyce,
International Minerals was not just Boyce redux. First, as the Court in International Minerals
pointed out, Boyce involved a constitutional void-for-vagueness claim whereas international
Minerals turned on the interpretation of the statute. Int'l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560-61.
Second, on the interpretative question, there was language in International Minerals legislative
history that arguably supported the defendant's reading of the statute. Several courts of appeals
had so interpreted the statute, holding that it provided for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense, id. at
565 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and in response to these decisions the I.C.C. had asked Congress to
amend the statute, either deleting the term "knowingly" altogether or replacing it with the
phrase, "being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for
the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles." Id. at 567. The Senate
passed the latter version of the suggested amendment, but the House did not, expressing concern
that removing "knowingly" from the statute and instead requiring proof only of a broader
awareness of the I.C.C. 's regulatory activity would in effect make the statute one of absolute
liability. Id. at 568. This it was unwilling to do, and "knowingly" was thus restored to the
statute. The argument that the statute meant what it seemed to say, i.e., that to be guilty one
must know that one's conduct is in violation of an I.C.C. regulation, thus had apparent though
indirect support in the statute's then most recent legislative history.
149
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Douglas and the five other justices rejected this argument, reading the
statute's "knowingly" term to require proof only that a violator knew that it was
shipping dangerous materials. 155 In Douglas's eyes, such knowledge of the
prohibited act's character-shipping dangerous acids-provided ample notice
to those engaging in that conduct that they risked criminal regulation. As with
the possession of narcotics in Balint and of hand grenades in Freed, Douglas
reasoned that "[t]he probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed
to be aware of the regulation.,,156
For the majority, then, the ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle was too strong to
be overcome by statutory language (supported by legislative history) which,
although susceptible to an interpretation providing for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw
defense, could also be read to provide for a more conventional term of scienter
applicable to conduct and its circumstances as opposed to the law itself. This
latter interpretation assured proof that violators knew the nature of their conduct-shipping corrosive chemicals. Such a reading of "knowingly violates
any such regulation" had no roots in blame but rather addressed Congress's
apparent notice concerns by assuring conduct notice while at the same time
providing the relatively strict enforcement necessitated by the potential danger
to the public that the shipment of hazardous substances involves.
In a concern that reverberates in the Court's later opinion in Liparota,157
Justices Stewart, Harlan and Brennan pointed out in the dissent that for
commercial shippers like International Minerals, such notice would probably
suffice. However, for the little guy-the one time "casual shipper"-it would
not. It was to protect these potential violators that, in the dissenters' view,
Congress meant to create an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Of course, the
punishment of blameless conduct always carries the possibility of convicting
the unwarned; however, that is only part of the notice question. Unaddressed
by the dissenters' concern for the casual shipper is the assessment of the need
for a broad net, that is, a prohibition without nettlesome excuses difficult to
overcome by proof. Congress, in dealing with a potential harm, might decide

1551d. at 560. The legislative history, as Douglas read it, marked not an endorsement ofan
ignorance-of-the-law defense but rather a rejection of the strict liability which would follow the
deletion ofthe term "knowingly." ld. at 563. Although he recognized that Congress could, as it
had in the past, id. at 564, carve out an exception to the ignorance-of-the-law principle, in his
view the legislative intent to so depart from this basic principle had to be more explicit before
he was prepared to recognize such a defense. ld.
1561d. at 565.
157
471 U.S. 419 (1985), discussed infra pp. 47-50.
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that protection of the public welfare requires it to impose through a regulatory
crime a duty of absolute liability, i.e., a duty that tolerates no mistakes or
ignorance, even the reasonable ones that a negligence standard would recognize
as an excuse. This would be true strict liability, something which neither Freed
nor International Minerals approached. 158
Such a categorical approach to blameless criminality would have to find its
constructive notice in the field of activity which was the subject of regulation
and in which the actor was engaged, notice that is more problematic. Without
proof that the accused knew, or even should have known, he was engaged in
the prohibited conduct, there must be some assurance that the activity in which
the accused engaged was sufficiently discrete and connected to the ultimate
potential for harm that those involved can fairly be said to appreciate the
possibility of criminal regulation. As noted, the Court in Balint l59 and

158 Freed's holding that the National Fireanns Act provided for strict liability on the
element of registration was expressly premised on the actor's assumed knowledge that he
possessed a dangerous piece of military weaponry (there, hand grenades), an understanding that
seems fairly attributable to persons covered by the Act, whether or not they actually understood
the nature ofthe particular forbidden weapon possessed. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,
606 (1971). And the statute at issue in International Minerals required proof that the shipper
knew the nature of that which it was shipping, i.e., potentially hazardous chemicals. Int'l
Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. In Staples, the case in which the Court returned to the National
Firearms Act thirty-three years after Freed to consider whether Congress intended strict liability
concerning the nature of the weapon possessed, Justice Thomas made this point. Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600,607 n.3 (1994) (discussed infra pp. 50-55). Certainly, neither
statute approaches the point at which a plausible claim could be made that strict liability violates
due process. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REv. 828, 835-36
(1999).
Professor Michaels argues that strict liability is constitutional so long as the state
constitutionally can punish the "non-strict-liability" elements of a crime. Id. at 835. Bigamy is
Michaels's example. Surely after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a legislature could
not constitutionally forbid simply getting married. More is required before the state can punish
that conduct. Bigamy, of course, adds the element of being married to another. Michaels asserts
that it would violate due process to impose strict liability for bigamy's element of "married to
another"-that is, to punish for bigamy even ifthe actor exercised "perfect care," as much care
as is possible, with respect to that element-because without that element, the legislature would
be punishing no more than the act of getting married. Michaels, supra, at 836. There could be
no valid claim of unconstitutional punishment in spite of "perfect care," i.e., of constitutional
innocence, for either Donald Freed or International Minerals & Chemical Corporation. The
legislature could constitutionally choose to punish, in the case of Freed, possession of
designated military weaponry, and, in the case of International Minerals, transportation of
hazardous chemicals in interstate commerce.
159 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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160
Dotterweich had apparently approved of such "field-of-activity" notice (as
opposed to the "conduct notice" provided by notice-based scienter), but it was
not clear after Lambert that the Court was prepared to continue to endorse
such strict liability. In both Freed and International Minerals the Court had
begun its analysis by observing that those respective cases did not involve true
strict liability. United States v. Park,161 on the other hand, did.

In Park, the Court revisited its controversial holding in Dotterweich,162
decided thirty-two years earlier. In Dotterweich, the Court held that the president of a corporate jobber that inadvertently mislabeled drugs purchased from
the manufacturer and offered them for resale under its own label could be
convicted for this mislabeling under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 163
simply upon proof that he, the president, had a "responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws."I64 The Dotterweich
holding was based on the Court's view of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act as:
[A] now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective
means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the
interest ofthe larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. 165

So read, the Act imposes strict liability, relying on a violator's participation
in the regulated activity and that activity's relation to the prohibited harm to
provide notice that the violator is behaving criminally. As noted above, the
Dotterweich court recognized that this reading of the statute would "doubtless"
create hardship in cases in which "consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting," but it deferred to what it saw as the congressional "balancing of
relative hardships" between the potential for punishment of unknowing vio-

United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
421 U.S. 658 (1975).
162 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3, at 431-33 & nn.70, 73 (attacking Dotterweich as among
those early, slip-shod mens rea opinions that do not "deserv[e] intellectual respect"). But see
Bilionis, supra note 46, at 1291-94 (defending Frankfurter's opinion in Dotterwiech as
"reflect[ing] a strongly process-oriented understanding ofthe Constitution's relationship with
the criminal law").
163
21 U.S.C. § 331(k)(1970)(current version at Pub. L. No. 109-59, title VII, § 7204,119
Stat. 1914 (2005)).
164 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284.
165Id. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
160

161
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lators and the need to protect "the innocent public" from mislabeled drug
products. 166
Park was the chief executive officer of a nationwide retail food chain that
had a warehouse in which federal inspectors found rodent droppings. Park was
charged under the same Food and Drug Act with the interstate shipping offood
that had been exposed to rodent contamination and thus "may have been
rendered injurious to health.,,167 Although Park's conviction was based solely
on his position as the CEO-there being no evidence that he was aware of the
rodent contamination-the Court upheld his conviction. In his opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger reiterated the perceived public necessities which
gave rise to this regulatory prohibition with its provisions which purtished even
those without consciousness of wrongdoing. 168
The Court again held that the Act imposed vicarious liability on corporate
employees or officers who, by virtue of their relationship to the subordinate
who actually committed the prohibited act or omission, were also deemed
responsible for it. 169 The Act, the Court held, imposed on such responsible
corporate officials "not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations
when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations will not occur. ,,170
The Act thus imposed on corporate officials a positive duty of perfect care
with respect to potentially harmful conditions wherever they may be, punishing
failures to find and to remedy such conditions without any showing that these
officials knew, or even should have known, that they existed. Three members
of the Court, Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, dissented to this seemingly
stark reading, arguing that the Act required proof that an accused such as Park
was at least negligent with respect to the offending conditions. 171 However,
there was no requirement on the face of the statute that an offender be proven
negligent in causing the contamination, and given the Act's regulatory nature,
there was no basis to presume any level of scienter in the face of this statutory
silence. A requirement that negligence, or any level of awareness concerning
the nature of the forbidden conduct, be proven would have had to be inferred

at 284-85.
21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4) (1968) (current version at Pub. L. No. 109-59, title VII, §
n02(a), 119 Stat. 1911 (2005». See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 661 n.l (1975).
168 Park, 421 U.S. at 668.
169Id. at 670-71.
170Id. at 672.
171Id. at 658 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166Id.

167
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out of a concern for notice. The presumption, however, runs against such an
inferred constructive notice requirement, a presumption overcome only by the
express or plainly inferable intent of Congress to correct the need/fairness
balance.
Although the Chief Justice conceded that the Act's absolute requirements
of "vigilance and foresight ... are beyond question demanding, and perhaps
onerous,,,I72 the Court found no evidence of a congressional desire to require a
notice-based element of negligence. The Act as written was not in the Court's
eyes overly unfair. Mr. Park was not in a position similar to Ms. Lambert,
subject to criminal liability for failing to fulfill a statutory obligation-there, to
register as a felon with the police-the existence of which she had no reason to
suspect. Rather, as the Chief Justice pointed out, Park was a corporate executive who voluntarily assumed a position of responsibility and authority in an
industry at the heart oflegitimate public concern for its health and well-being.
The need for the highest vigilance on the part of corporate officers like Park
was great, and due to his voluntary participation in this field of endeavor, he
stood fairly warned of the risks. The need/fairness balance suggested no reason
to require the further notice to him which proof of negligence would have
provided. Congress apparently chose not to provide for it, and the Court was
willing to so read the statute, harsh though it seemed.
Three years later in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 173 the
Court provided the counter balance, holding that the Sherman Act, at least in its
criminal application, was intended by Congress to include a mens rea element-knowledge of the prohibited conduct's likely anticompetitive effect. 174
In reaching this result, the Court openly employed notice analysis (although
occasionally cloaked in the rhetoric of blame), balancing fairness concerns
against societal needs in antitrust enforcement.
In Gypsum, six major corporate producers of gypsum board, which together
accounted for the vast majority of the national sales ofthis important building
material, along with several executives of these companies were indicted and
convicted of combining and conspiring to "restrain[ ] ... interstate trade and
commerce in the manufacture and sale of gypsum board," in violation of
section One of the Sherman Act. 175 Specifically, indictments charged that the

Id.
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
174 I d. at 444.
175 See id. at 427.
172
173
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defendants and their unindicted co-conspirators 176 engaged in a conspiracy to
fix prices as well as the tenns and conditions of sales and the methods of
packaging and handling gypsum board. 177 The core of the case was the charge
that the conspirators contacted one another to fix and then specifically to verify
prices and tenns and conditions of sales. 178 Although they disputed the extent
of these contacts, particularly their price verification efforts, the defendants
maintained that the price verifications which did occur were legal exchanges of
price infonnation the purpose of which was not to restrain trade but to enable
them (l) to "meet the competition" as pennitted under the Robinson-Patman
Act l79 and (2) to prevent customer fraud. 180 The district court's instructions to
the jury purportedly recognized the Robinson-Patman "meet-the-competition"
defense, but went on to charge that:
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing
information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to
them are presumed, as a matter oflaw, to have intended that result. ISI

Such a legal presumption of intent, of course, amounts to strict liability.
In an opinion again by Chief Justice Burger, the Court reversed. The Court
began with what it characterized as the criminal law's "generally inhospitable
attitude to non-mens rea offenses,,,182 recognizing the common law tradition as
the basis for this presumption of mens rea. However, once the Chief Justice
turned specifically to the Shennan Act, his mens rea analysis was almost
exclusively notice-based, even if his rhetoric was not.
At the core of the Chief Justice's analysis was his recognition that the
Shennan Act, even as judicially narrowed,183 punished conduct for the most

176 The two remaining major manufacturers of gypsum board, along with the Gypsum
Association were named as unindicted co-conspirators. Id. at 427 n.2.
177 Id. at 427.
178 I d. at 428-29.
179Id. at 429 n.4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § l3(b) (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § l3(b)
(2000))).
180Id. at 429.
181 Id. at 430.
182 I d. at 438. The apparent reason for this analytic jump was the Court's conflation of
regulatory crime and strict liability. See id. at 442 n.18. The Court may also have been seeking
the benefit of the traditional presumption of scienter, but its careful notice-based reasoning in
support of its holding belies such an instrumental approach.
183 Section One of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:
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part by the economic results which it engendered. As the Chief Justice pointed
out, on the facts of Gypsum the exchange of price data among competitors is
not invariably anticompetitive in effect. Such conduct is only a violation of the
Act when, as there occurred, it has that result. 184 Imposing criminal sanctions
on the basis of such hindsight, while hardly unprecedented in criminal law, 185
creates difficulties on both the need and fairness sides of the notice balance. If
conduct that is potentially justifiable because it might foster increased
competition turns out to be criminal because of its actual anticompetitive impact, fair warning concerns seem obvious. True, they may be no greater than
those applicable to executives like John Park, whom the Food and Drug Act
punish without even a showing of negligence if a warehouse in their respective
corporate empires turns up infested with mice. However, it would seem to be a
fair legislative judgment that the need for sanitation in the food industry may
require the extra vigilance thought to flow from the duty of perfect care
imposed by strict liability. Whether the imposition of such an unforgiving
standard of care actually results in more sanitary warehouses may be open to
question, but there seems to be no compelling social benefit that might be
chilled or foregone due to such heavy-handed deterrence.

Every contract, combination in the fonn of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955) (current version at Pub. L. No. 108-237, title II, § 215(a), 118 Stat. 668
(2004». Since by design all contracts and commercial combinations restrain trade through their
mutually agreed limitations in the participants' future commercial behavior, the Act was
judicially narrowed to forbid "only such contracts and combinations ... [which] by reason of
intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly
restraining competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade." Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
184 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 440--41 & n.16.
185 As Justice Holmes pointed out in Nash v. United States, holding that the Shennan Act's
"rule of reason" was not unconstitutionally vague as a standard of criminality:
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly,
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. Ifhis judgment is
wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur
the penalty of death. . .. The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in
[criminal homicide] cases at common law was, that a man might have to answer with
his life for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. The criterion in
such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the
circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.
Nash, 229 U.S. at 237 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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In contrast, the line of criminality under the Sherman Act marks the difference between meeting the competition in a highly competitive market-a
congressionally endorsed activity, and fixing prices to reduce competition-a
crime. Imposing absolute criminal liability for economic conduct falling in
such a "gray zone" of potential benefit or harm may be socially harmful in that
it may chill "salutary and pro-competitive conduct lying close to the borderline
of impermissible conduct.,,186 The notice balance thus overcame the presumption that Congress did not intend to create a specific notice defense, and
the Court held that the Sherman Act, in its criminal application, required proof
of criminal intent. 187
In deciding what level of intent it ought to infer, the Court continued with
its application of the fairness/needs balance in the context of business decisionmaking to which the antitrust laws apply. The Court dismissed negligence and
recklessness as inappropriate standards of criminality in this gray area of possible anti competitive effect. 188 As between "knowledge" and "purpose," the
Court reasoned that requiring proof of the "knowledge oflikely effects" would
appropriately balance the fairness and deterrence concerns in an activity
involving "conscious behavior normally undertaken after a full consideration of
the desired results and a weighing of the costs, benefits, and risks,,189 whereas
requiring proof of the "conscious desire to bring [those likely effects] to
fruition. . . particularly in such a context, [would be] both unnecessarily
cumulative and unduly burdensome.,,19o The Court thus concluded that

186 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 441-43 & n.17 (expressly distinguishing its decision in Park on
this social-impact basis). See also Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance ofFact an Excuse Only for the
Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2123, 2126 (1998) (noting that strict liability can "overdeter" and
arguing that strict liability is inappropriate when applied to a factual element that marks "the
boundary line between morally desirable and morally undesirable behavior"). Because of these
concerns, as the Court noted, both the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
Antitrust Laws and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department had concluded that criminal
prosecution should be reserved for cases in which it is clear, both in law and in fact, that the
conduct was a flagrant violation of the Act. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 439-40. The Court noted that
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department adopted guidelines emphasizing that only
willful violators of the Act should be prosecuted, thus seeming to reserve liability only for those
who had actual notice of their unlawfulness. Id.
187 Id. at 443-44.
188 Although the Court here gave no reason, this rejection of a level of scienter less than
knowledge or purpose seems appropriate given that the statute is marking the line between criminal business conduct and justifiable business conduct that Congress has encouraged through
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Kahan, supra note 186, at 2126.
189 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 445-46.
190Id. at 446.

46

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

"[w ]here carefully planned and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the
context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator's knowledge of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent.,,191
After Lambert, Freed, International Minerals, Park and Gypsum, the Court
had laid out the four comers of notice-based scienter, even if it had not filled in
all the blanks or even explicitly recognized it as a concept distinct from
traditional, blame-based mens rea. Lambert recognized the importance of
scienter as an instrument of notice,192 but Freed and International Minerals
demonstrated the Court's continuing commitment to the presumption that fair
notice flows from the nature of the conduct regulated, a presumption that remains unrebutted as long as it seems apparent that potential violators would
likely be aware of the nature of their offending conduct. 193 Park extended this
reasoning to the field of activity regulated as an instrument of notice, declining
to infer notice-based mens rea even if the actor was almost certainly unaware of
the offending conduct in question. l94 Gypsum, however, staked out the limits
of this fair-notice presumption, inferring congressional intent to provide for
notice-based mens rea where both the activity regulated and the conduct in
question left a serious question concerning the notice provided to potential
violators. 195 However, no sooner had this construct emerged than it began to
fall apart as the Court disregarded its own teachings in a series of cases that
began with Liparota v. United States .196
LIPAROTA-CONFLATION OF BLAME AND NOTICE

In Liparota, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of a Chicago
restauranteur who had been convicted of the unauthorized acquisition and possession of federal food stamps in violation of section 2024(b)( 1) of the Federal
Food Stamp Act. Mr. Liparota operated a sandwich shop which was not authorized to accept food stamps, and he was not individually eligible under the
statute to use or acquire them. Nevertheless, on three occasions he purchased a
quantity of food stamps from an undercover federal agent, each time paying a
heavily discounted price for the stamps. 197

191/d.
192

355 U.S. 225
401 U.S. 601
194
421 U.S. 658
195 438 U.S. 422
196
471 U.S. 419
197Id. at 421.
193

(1957).
(1971); 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
(1975).
(1978).
(1985).
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Section 2024(b)(I) provides, in relevant part, "whoever knowingly ...
acquires ... or possesses coupons . . . in any manner not authorized by this
chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall ... be guilty of a
felony .... ,,198 Looking to the statutory term "knowingly," Mr. Liparota
sought to defend by asserting he did not know his acquisition and possession of
the stamps was unauthorized, an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense seemingly
foreclosed by the Court's decisions in Boyce and International Minerals. 199 In
an unacknowledged departure from this line of precedent, the Supreme Court
chose to frame the issue differently and reversed. Justice Brennan, writing for a
six-justice majority, held section 2024(b)(I) required proof that an accused
"knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner
unauthorized by statute or regulations.,,2oo This result, as Justice Brennan
explained, was "particularly appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute
otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent condUCt.,,201 If by "innocent conduct" Justice Brennan meant not blameworthy,
that would seem to be an analytic non-sequitor because the statute in question
was plainly part of a regulatory scheme intended to ensure proper use of food
stamps, themselves a creature of statute. There is no suggestion that the Court
considered the criminal provisions of the Food Stamp Act to outlaw conduct
that, as a matter of societal consensus, was harmful or wrongful. This is a
classic regulatory crime, and the Court's opinion made it clear that the concern
was not blame but notice.
The Court seemed concerned that under the Act a large class of relatively
unsophisticated persons-food stamp users-faced potential felony liability
based on violations of technical, and sometimes administratively defined, categories of authorized acquisition, possession and use of something which was a
vital part of their lives-food stamps. Liparota thus differed from both Boyce
and International Minerals, each of which dealt with criminalizing violations
of a regulatory scheme applicable to industries accustomed to regulation.
Notice in cases like Boyce and International Minerals was augmented by the
field of activity in which likely violators had chosen to engage. While the
dissenters in International Minerals expressed concern that the occasional
"casual shipper" might stumble into the web of regulation-and a criminal

198 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420 n.l (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1981) (current version at
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2000))).
199 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422. But cf Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337 (1952); Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp. v. United States, 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
200 Liparota, 417 U.S. at 433.
201 Id. at 426.
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conviction-in Liparota there seemed to be a more significant danger of such
unwitting criminality. The Court responded to this notice concern by reading
the statute to impose the buffer of an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense between
such "innocents" and their conviction. 202
As a matter of social policy, the Court may have reached the right result in
Liparota;203 however, it did so not by careful notice balancing, but instead by
disregarding the blame-notice distinction altogether. Justice Brennan began his
scienter analysis by going straight to Morissette, citing its recognition of the
background assumption that mens rea is a part of every crime.204 Morissette, of
course, owes its importance to its refusal to extend to federal crimes with
common law roots the "strict liability" which the Court earlier in the century
began to apply in regulatory crimes such as the narcotics laws in Balinr05 and
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in Dotterweich. 206 However, unlike
Morissette, Liparota dealt not with a federal codification of a common law
offense or its modem analog but with the criminal enforcement provisions of a
regulatory scheme which governed the operation of the federal food stamp
program, which is, as noted, entirely a creature of the Food Stamp Act and its

202Id. at 425-27. The majority refused to characterize this holding as one which permitted
an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Id. at 425 n.9. Justice Brennan vigorously insisted that on the
contrary this approach represented no more than the application of the traditional mens rea
doctrine which presumes the existence of some scienter element and thus permits a mistake
defense. Id. at 425. But, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, the question of what is and is
not authorized regarding food stamps is set forth in the statutes and regulations of which section
2024 is a part, i.e., in the law defining the offense. Id. at 438-39 (White, J., dissenting). That
question of authorization, in other words, is answered by the very criminal prohibition which
Mr. Liparota was accused of violating, and his mistake or ignorance in that regard is one oflaw
which is not a defense unless the legislature explicitly so provides.
Justice Brennan, of course, was no stranger to this ignorance-of-the-Iaw principle. He also
appreciated that the reach of "knowingly" in the statute was ambiguous, id. at 424-25 (majority
opinion), thus undercutting any argument that Congress plainly meant to provide for an
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. Justice Brennan sought to avoid these doctrinal obstacles by
characterizing the mistake concerning authorized use of the stamps as implicating issues of
culpability and blame. Id. at 425 n.9. With the element of unauthorized use so characterized,
Brennan held the doctrinal presumption in favor of scienter required the ambiguity concerning
the reach of "knowingly" be resolved in favor of requiring proof the defendant knew his
possession of the stamps was unauthorized. Id. at 425.
203 Justice White, in his dissent, argued with some force that if one assumes responsible
prosecution, the trap for the unwary, which concerned the Court, was not nearly as large or
troubling as Justice Brennan suggested. Id. at 437 & n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 425-26 (majority opinion).
205 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
206 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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207

ensuing regulations.
And unlike Morissette, the Court's explicit concern in
Liparota was not that proof of mens rea was a necessary part of proving the
criminal act. Rather, although couched in the rhetoric of blame, Justice
Brennan's concern was one of notice to unwary putative violators of the Food
Stamp Act.
The Court's insistent resort to the inapt blameworthiness analysis seems
attributable to its dissatisfaction with the legislative response to the notice
concern. While the Food Stamp Act expressly provided that to be criminal the
regulatory violation had to be "knowing," as the Court itself had pointed out in
Boyce and again in International Minerals, such a knowledge provision had
always been understood to require proof that an accused violator was aware of
the nature of his or her conduct, but not to require proofthat the accused knew
such conduct was criminally prohibited. 208 Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Lest this analysis appear wooden and insensitive to the difference between
food-stamp users on the one hand and interstate shippers on the other, the
knowledge that had to be proved in Mr. Liparota's case was that he possessed
food stamps and knew what they were, that is, coupons issued by the Federal
Department of Agriculture to be used by low-income persons to purchase food,
generally at retail food stores. 209 Although Justice Brennan, foretelling an
approach in subsequent opinions of the Court, identified possible hypothetical
applications of the statute to "innocents," proof of such particular conduct
awareness and the constructive notice of the conduct's criminality thus imparted would seem to go far in addressing concerns that the statute created a
trap for the unwary. Moreover, Justice Brennan completely ignored the needs
side of the notice balance, a potentially weighty congressional concern when
dealing with the prevention of abuses in a vast and expensive program for
providing important assistance to the nation's poor.

207 While in part the food stamp regulations forbade the fraudulent use ofthese coupons,
and thus could be said to impart a traditional criminal law focus to the Act, as noted, it was not
this aspect of the regulatory prohibitions which concerned the Court. Rather, the Court was
concerned with what it characterized "a broad range of apparently innocent conduct" forbidden
by the regulations, such as the use of food coupons to purchase food items at prices above
prevailing prices from participating retailers. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426. Perhaps even more so
than the antitrust laws at issue in Gypsum, the Food Stamp Act was a pure regulatory criminal
provision without, at least in the applications of concern to the Court, any blameworthiness
content.
208 See United States v. Int'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,560--63 (1971);
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 n.15, 345 (1952).
209 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 n.2.

50

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

In the end, it was the result that mattered. Apparently dissatisfied with the
presumption of restraint which conventionally attends notice analysis, requiring
statutory ambiguity to be resolved by limiting the reach of "knowingly" to the
nature of the offending conduct, Justice Brennan and his colleagues shortcircuited the interpretive process. The result was a curious analytic hybrid in
which under the rubric of blameworthiness-and its inapt mens rea presumption-they read this regulatory statute to require proof of actual notice of
its command, providing for an ignorance-of-the-law defense.
LIPAROTA'S LEGACy-RA1ZLAF AND STAPLES

Rather than being an aberrant departure from principled analysis in
response to a pocket of apparent unfairness in the federal criminal code,
Liparota has become the fulcrum of the Court's emerging scienter analysis.
The distinction between traditional mens rea (with its presumption grounded in
the blameworthiness characteristic of common law crime) and the concept of
notice-based scienter (in which the presumption runs the other way) seems lost
in the Court's interpretive work. In its place is an undifferentiated presumption
of scienter flowing from a broad concern that without a requirement that
conduct be animated by a ''wrongful purpose"-that is, a purpose imbued
somehow with blame-"a broad range of apparently innocent conduct" would
be made crimina1. 2lO This confluence of blameworthiness and notice concerns
prompted the Court in Staples v. United Statei 11 to require proof that the
accused know the nature of his conduct in a regulatory offense where no such
scienter requirement was suggested by the text or legislative history of the
statute212 and in United States v. RatzlaJ213 to require proof that the accused
know the illegality of his conduct where no such departure from the ignoranceof-the-law principle was suggested by the statute or its history.
IGNORANCE OF LAW:

RA 1ZLAF

RatzlaJinvolved violations of the Federal Money Laundering Control Act,
a statute enacted in part to facilitate effective enforcement of the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, more familiarly known as the Bank Se-

210

211

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (quoting Lparota, 471 U.S. at 426).
!d.

212 !d. at 619-20; see, e.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513,523
(1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,70 (1994).
213
510 U.S. 135 (1994).

2007-2008]

MENS REA AND REGULATORY CRIME

51

crecy Act. 214 The Bank Secrecy Act was designed to combat the use of banking
and financial institutions by criminals such as drug dealers, and it required
reports to the Treasury Department of a variety of financial transactions
including, as here relevant, reports by domestic financial institutions of any
cash deposit totaling $10,000 or more.215 Because it turned out to be relatively
simple to avoid this requirement by breaking such deposits into lesser amounts,
Congress subsequently passed the so-called antistructuring provision of the
Money Laundering Control Act,216 which provided:
No person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of [the
above noted provision of the Bank Secrecy Act] with respect to such
transactions ... (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or
assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial
217
institutions.

This antistructuring provision thus became part of the web of federal
regulations concerning currency transactions. Each such regulatory requirement was criminally enforced under a single provision, section 5322(a) of title
31, which authorized fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to five
years for any person "willfully violating" that statute or its regulations. 2I8
Waldemar Ratzlafwas charged with violations of the anti structuring provision when he paid off a $100,000 casino-gambling debt with cashier checks
in amounts of less than $10,000. 219 Ratzlaf defended by arguing that his acts
were not "willful" under section 5322 because, while he knew of and sought to
avoid the reporting requirement, he did not know that it was unlawful so to
structure his currency transactions. 22o In support of this argument, he cited
Cheek v. United States,221 a criminal tax case in which the Court had relied on
longstanding but narrow precedent to hold that "willfully," as used in the

214 I d. at 138 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5325 (1993) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§
5311-5325 (2000»).
215 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138-39 n.3.
216 Id. at 138 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No. 108-458, title
VI, § 6203(g), 118 Stat. 3747 (2004»).
217 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No.1 08-458, title VI, § 6203(g),
118 Stat. 3747 (2004».
218
31 U.S.C. § 5322 (l993)(cited in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140). Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-56, title III, §§ 353(b),
363(b), 115 Stat. 323, 332 (2001»).
219 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137.
220 I d. at 138.
221
498 U.S. 192 (1991).
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criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, provides for an ignorance-ofthe-law defense. The lower courts in RatzlaJrejected this extension of Cheek
beyond the tax code, holding that Congress did not intend for the Bank Secrecy
Act to provide for a similar defense. 222
The Supreme Court reversed and held that to act "willfully" under section
5322, a person must know that his conduct is illegal. 223 The Court attempted to
fit its analysis into the conventional doctrinal framework, implicitly recognizing
that a departure from the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse
requires clear and explicit legislative direction. The Court saw the term "willfully" in section 5322 as providing that mandate. However, an examination of
that term, both as conventionally understood and as used in section 5322, does
not support the Court's conclusion.
Starting with the term itself, the word "willfully" traditionally has been
construed as meaning that an actor must know the nature of his or her conduct.
While "willfully" can mean more, including, as the Court held in Cheek, imposing a specific intent to act unlawfully/24 such expansion of the conventional
interpretation of the term must be clear from either its use in the statute or the
legislative history of the statute in question. 225
The Court purported to find support for its construction in the statutory
framework, reasoning that to read "willfully" conventionally-that is, requiring
only that Ratzlaf knew he was acting to circumvent the Bank Secrecy Act's
reporting requirements but not that he knew that it was illegal-would render
"willfully" surplusage. That was so according to the Court because the antistructuring provision itself required proof that Ratzlaf and others like him act
"for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of [the Bank Secrecy
Act],,,226 proof which necessarily entailed establishing Ratzlafs knowledge of
the financial institution's reporting requirement. 227 This argument, however,

222 Ratz/af,
223/d.

510 U.S. at 138.

224/d. at 141. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at201 (citing and applying United States v. Murdock,
290 U.S. 389 (1933»; see a/so United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
225 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (Official Draft 1985) (providing that "[ a] requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with
respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements
appears"). See a/so Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943) (observing that ''willful''
is "a word of many meanings"); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184,191 (1998).
226 Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 140 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1993) (current version at Pub. L. No.
107-56, title III, §§ 353(b), 363(b), 115 Stat. 323, 332 (2001»).
227 Ratz/af, 510 U.S. at 140.
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overlooks the application of section 5322, the Bank Secrecy Act's enforcement
provision, to the Act's other regulatory requirements, many of which impose
reporting or record-keeping obligations. As to them, the requirement of "willful" conduct, conventionally understood-that is, that a person act with full
awareness of the nature of his conduct-is hardly surplusage. Rather, it is exactly the kind of notice-based scienter, requiring proof of "conduct awareness,"
to which legislatures traditionally have looked to answer their concern for fair
notice in regulatory crime. The fact that the Bank Secrecy Act's overall
criminal enforcement provision, with its requirement of willful behavior, also
applies to the later added antistructuring provision, which by its terms requires
that the actor act with a purpose independently satisfying the willfulness
requirement, does not make that overall willfulness requirement surplusage.
Section 5322's "willfully" requirement ensures that all violators of the Bank
Secrecy Act have full "conduct notice" as a predicate to conviction.
Moreover, the purpose requirement of the anti structuring provision, section
5324, does more than simply duplicate the requirement of willful conduct.
This purpose requirement limits criminality to only those structuring efforts
which have no purpose other than avoiding a transaction report. 228 That
Congress's effort to narrowly define a regulatory offense, through the timehonored practice of providing for an element of specific intent, has the ancillary
effect of satisfying the Act's overall "willfulness" requirement does not make
either statutory term surplusage. 229

228 As the Court recognized, there may well be reasons to structure one's cash transactions
other than to avoid a report to Treasury. Id. at 144-45.
229 As part of its argument that Congress intended "willfully" to provide for an ignoranceof-the-law defense, the Court also asserted that courts of appeals had so read the term in its
application to sections ofthe Bank Secrecy Act other than the anti structuring provision. Id. at
141-42. However, as Justice Blackmun again pointed out, id. at 153-54 n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), the Court overstated its case. Although many of the lower court decisions do
interpret "willfully" to require knowledge of the law coupled with a "specific intent to commit
the crime," id. at 141 (majority opinion) and cases cited, most of these cases stand for the
conventional proposition that when applied to a crime of omission, such as failing to file a
required report, "willfully" requires proof that the actor knew of the reporting requirement and
intended to disobey it. They do not, however, further require proof that the actor knew his
conduct was illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978) (cited
in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141). Those few that go farther and read "willfully" to require proof that
the actor knew also that his or her conduct was illegal mistakenly rest on Cheek, see, e.g.,
United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476--77 (6th Cir. 1991)(cited in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at
142), which as discussed is expressly limited to the tax laws. See supra notes 221 & 222 and
accompanying text. The Court's concern, then, that unless section 5322's "willfully" includes
an ignorance-of-the-law defense as applied to the antistructuring provision it will have a
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The legislative history was no more helpful to the Court's reading of
"willfully," revealing that to the extent Congress focused on this issue it intended the opposite result. The Court's answer to this contrary legislative
history-that when statutory text is clear, there is no occasion to resort to
legislative histori30-is hard to take seriously given its tortured reading of the
statute. If the statute is clear, it is in the opposite direction. Moreover, in the
next breath the Court appeared to retreat from its suggestion of textual clarity
when it invoked the lenity principle as support for resolving the statute's textual
ambiguity in favor of the defendant. 231
Why, then, in the face of contrary indications at every tum, did the Court
insist on reading an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense into the enforcement provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act? The majority's opinion provides no clear
answer, but a careful reading suggests that the Court's post-Liparota fusion of
blame and notice lies at the heart of its analysis. In its brief, the government
had argued that it was unnecessary to take the extraordinary step of ensuring
actual notice to putative offenders through an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense,
asserting that "structuring is not the kind of activity that an ordinary person
would engage in innocently.,,232 Although couched in the language of
"innocence," this is a straightforward application of the constructive notice
analysis on which cases like International Minerals and Boyce Motor Lines are
premised. 233 Persons knowingly engaged in the conduct forbidden by the
statute or in activity regulated by it ordinarily have sufficient notice of potential
criminal liability and need not be afforded the actual notice which an
ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense would ensure. This analysis has nothing to do
with blameworthiness, although to be sure if the conduct in question is blameworthy then constructive notice of illegality seems assured.

different meaning than it has when applied to the other provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act was
misplaced. By interpreting "willfully" to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense the Court
ensured a uniform construction for that term within the Bank Secrecy Act. However, it did so
by abandoning the conventional interpretation of "willfully" which courts had long used without
apparent difficulty, an interpretation rooted in the fundamental principle that ignorance of the
law is no excuse.
230 Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48.
231 Id. at 148-49. This is, first, a curious application ofthe lenity principle since the ambiguity seemed to be of the Court's own making. Moreover, it completely ignores the more
fundamental principle that statutory ambiguity is to be resolved against, not in favor of, providing an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense. See supra pp. 19-23,27-28,34,38-39.
232Id. at 144 (quoting Brieffor United States at 29, Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135
(1994) (No. 92-1196)).
233 See supra pp. 22-24, 31-33.
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The Court nevertheless responded to this notice argument in the framework
of blameworthiness, pointing out that currency structuring is not the exclusive
province of "bad men.,,234 To demonstrate that "currency structuring is not
inevitably nefarious,,,m the Court cited three hypothetically "non-nefarious"
violators, then concluded:
In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that
structuring is so obviously "evil" or inherently "bad" that the "willfulness"
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the
illegality of structuring. Had Congress wished to dispense with the
requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction?36

This argument reveals how dramatically Liparota and its fusion of blameworthiness and notice concerns have altered the Court's scienter analysis. The
presumption that the contours of the criminal law are known-and thus that
ignorance of the law does not excuse-is not, as the Court in RatzlaJassumes,
limited to crimes committed exclusively by "bad" or "nefarious" people.
People who commit regulatory crimes are not necessarily "bad" people. Mr.
Dotterweich, whose company may inadvertently have mislabeled some overthe-counter drugs, was not thereby a "bad" person; Mr. Park, whose company
had mice in one of its food storage warehouses, was not for that reason "nefarious." But that is quite beside the point when the question is whether Congress,
in enacting the respective regulatory statutes under which each was charged,
intended a particular level of scienter, the proof of which would ensure a particular level of notice. In the cases of Mr. Dotterweich and Mr. Park, the Court
held that Congress meant to impose something close to absolute liability, not
because they were "bad actors" but because, due to the fields of activity in
which these men were engaged and to the societal need for widespread "no excuses" enforcement, Congress was apparently satisfied that they had sufficient
notice of criminal liability without proof that either knew or should have known
of the violations, much less the law forbidding those violations. 237
The proper question regarding Mr. Ratzlaf, as well as those persons in the
examples cited by the Court, is whether Congress was satisfied that by acting
"willfully"-Le., mindful of the Bank Secrecy Act's reporting requirement and
with a purpose to evade that requirement-they had sufficient notice of

234
235
236
237

Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144.
[d.
[d. at 146 (footnote omitted).
See supra pp. 37-39.
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possible criminality. The motives of the individual actors for their conduct are
here irrelevant, as is their apparent moral culpability. The only relevant
question is whether Congress believed something more than the constructive
notice which would flow from proof that violators knew exactly what they were
doing-hiding from the government something which the law required them to
report-should be a part of the criminal enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Nothing in the text or history of the statute remotely suggests such a congressional concern.
That the Court would state, as it did in concluding this part of its opinion,
"[h]ad Congress wished to dispense with the requirement [that knowledge of
the law be proved], it could have furnished the appropriate instruction,,,238
shows just how topsy-turvy the Court's mens rea jurisprudence had become.
U ntii Liparota, congressional silence concerning scienter was met with the presumption of scienter only when such scienter is blame-based. Here, the Court
used the presumption of scienter as a basis for the requirement that knowledge
of the criminal law itself be proved. Of course, that is exactly what the Court
did in Liparota. But in Liparota, the Court at least tried to camouflage the
defense it created as one of mistake-of-fact required by blameworthiness
considerations so as to stay within the doctrinal use of the presumption?39 Nine
years later, the blame/notice distinction was so frayed that either such doctrinal
distortion no longer mattered or it was not even noticed. 240
IGNORANCE OF FACT: STAPLES

If RatzlaJ marked the full impact of the Liparota approach to scienter on
cases involving ignorance-of-the-Iaw defenses, Staples v. United States,241
decided four months later, was its counterpart in those raising ignorance-of-fact
claims.242 Harold Staples was charged under the National Firearms Acf43 with
possessing an unregistered automatic rifle, that is, an assault rifle which fired
continuously in response to a single trigger squeeze. This was the same statute

Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985).
240 Although Justice Blackmun in his dissent plainly appreciates the notice orientation of
the issue before the Court and the irrelevance of the forbidden conduct's inherent "evil," he, too,
accepts the decisional axis ofinnocentlwrongful conduct "in exceptional cases." Ratzlaf, 510
U.S. at 155 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
242Id. at 609-12.
243 National Fireanns Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1986) (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5872 (2000)).
238
239
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which the Court had reviewed twenty-three years earlier in United States v.
Freed. 244 Section 5861 (d) of the Act made it a crime punishable by up to ten
years imprisonment for any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not
registered to him,,,245 and other sections of the Act defined "firearm" to include
an automatic rifle such as the one Staples possessed. 246 In Freed, the Court
decided that the Act required no scienter for the registration element, basing its
interpretation on the lack of any mens rea term in the statute along with the
statute's regulatory nature. 247
The firearms possessed in Freed were hand grenades, which as Justice
Douglas noted by their appearance suggested the possibility of regulation and
the attendant requirement of registration. 248 Staples's assault rifle, however,
was arguably not so obviously regulated. By its outward appearance, Staples's
assault rifle could not be distinguished from a semiautomatic rifle, which was
not covered by the Act. 249 Staples claimed that he did not know that his rifle
was automatic. 250 This mistake concerning the gun's capacity for automatic fire
would constitute a cognizable defense only if the statute required scienter for
that circumstance element.
Analysis of Staples's scienter claim would seem to be straightforward. The
National Firearms Act was enacted to regulate and restrict the possession ofa
narrow class of dangerous weaponry.251 In Freed, the Court had recognized
violations of its provisions as regulatory offenses standing on different ground
from those rooted in the common law.252 The statute itself, as noted above,
contains no term of scienter, and given the regulatory nature of the statute there
is no basis to presume the existence of such an element. If a term of mens rea
were to be inferred, it could only come from evidence of congressional concern
that proof of heightened "conduct awareness" was necessary to strike the

United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,607 (1971). See supra pp. 35-37.
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1968) (invalidated by United States v. Vest, 448 F. Supp. 2d
1002, 1003 (S.D. Ill. 2006)). The Act's punishment provisions are set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 5871
(1984).
246 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (1986) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 5845 (2000)).
247 See supra pp. 35-37.
248'Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-09.
249 I d. at 608.
250Id. at 607.
251 In his dissent, Justice Stevens carefully reviews the legislative history of the Act, a history which leaves no doubt as to the Act's regulatory character. Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600,626-29 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
does not quarrel with that characterization. Id. at 606-07 (majority opinion).
252 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-09.
244

245
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proper balance between the need for broad enforcement of the regulatory
provision on the one hand and the potential for unfair or arbitrary enforcement
on the other.
Here, the Court was not writing on a blank: slate. The district court in
Staples's trial, drawing on circuit court decisions,253 instructed the jury that the
government must prove that Staples knew he possessed a gun and "that he
[was] dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelyhood of regulation. ,,254 The question for the Court, then, was whether Congress
intended more notice to putative violators than would be assured by such a jury
determination.
The language of the statute yields no evidence of such legislative intent.
As noted, there is no term of scienter whatsoever, and the Act considered as a
whole suggests this omission was an intentional component of an overall
legislative scheme strictly to regulate the dangerous weaponry favored by
gangsters. 255 As was so for the Bank: Secrecy Act considered by the Court in
RatzlaJ,256 to the extent that the National Firearms Act's legislative history
reveals anything concerning the existence of notice-based scienter, the history
seems to speak against rather than for it. 257 Finally, even if the statute itself and
its legislative history were less clear on this point than they appear to be, such
legislative ambiguity would not provide any basis to infer the notice-based
element of "knowledge" for which Staples argued. A court should not infer
that the legislature intended a notice-based mens rea term unless it is apparent
from the statutory context that the balance of the need for strict enforcement on
the one hand and the potential for unfair impact or arbitrary enforcement on the
other suggests it. 258
If anything, the notice balance in Staples pointed away from, not toward,
requiring proof that offenders knew the characteristics oftheir weapons which
made their possession criminal. On the need side of the balance, strict enforcement of the regulatory regime would appear to be quite important. The point of
the legislation was tQ permit the government to keep track of what was

See, e.g., Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir. 1963).
Staples, 511 U.S. at 604.
255 Justice Stevens makes this point well in his dissent. Id. at 626-27 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
256 See, e.g., Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
257 Staples, 511 U.S. at 626-27 (setting forth pertinent legislative history). It is telling in
this regard that Justice Thomas's opinion for the majority did not once mention the legislative
history ofthe Act. See id. 601-10 (majority opinion).
258 See supra pp. 20-23.
253

254
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essentially military weaponry, thereby limiting its circulation. The Act was not
concerned with pistols or guns of the type that might be of legitimate use to
householders or sportsmen. Rather, the Act was limited in scope to such
weapons as machine guns, hand grenades and artillery pieces, weapons that
pose a serious threat to public safety.259 The need for broad, excuse-free enforcement of the Act thus appears substantial.
On the other hand, the potential for unfair or arbitrary enforcement of the
Act in the absence of the "knowledge" element for which Staples argued seems
relatively low. To be sure, absolute liability-that is, enforcement in complete
disregard of what a possessor might know concerning a weapon regulated by
the Act-might work some unfairness. However, the Act had long been interpreted to require proof at least that the possessor knew the item in question was
a gun. As noted, the district court in Staples went further, requiring in addition
proof that Mr. Staples knew that he possessed "a dangerous device ofa type as
would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.,,26o Proof of such knowledge,
coupled with the type and appearance of the weapons in question-in Staples's
case, an assault rifle identical in appearance to an M-l6-would seem to be
more than adequate to cabin the potential for unfair enforcement.261 At the very
least it would seem that a congressional judgment so striking the notice balance

259 Far from being silent on this point, the legislative history of the Act was replete with
this concern. Staples, 511 U.S. at 626-28 nn.4-5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260Id. at 604 (majority opinion).
261 Taking his cue directly from Liparota, Justice Thomas reasoned that because the lawful
ownership of guns was so widespread their possession was "innocent" conduct from which
constructive notice of the Act's prohibition would not flow. Id. Even assuming, as Justice
Thomas did here, that "[g]uns in general are not 'deleterious devices or products or obnoxious
waste materials,' [which were the subject of regulation in] International Minerals, that put their
owners on notice that they stand 'in responsible relation to a public danger,'" id. at 610-11,
"guns in general" were not what the Act prohibited possessing. Rather, the Act prohibited the
possession of military weapons, a few of which-including the assault rifle which Staples
possessed-were, unless closely examined, indistinguishable from a class of semiautomatic
weapons which were lawful to possess. Moreover, in expressing his concern that "innocent"
persons might be prosecuted, Justice Thomas chose to ignore that this relevant "notice class" of
weapons was further narrowed by the requirement imposed by the district court that Staples
"[knew] that he [was] dealing with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the
likelihood of regulation." Id. at 604. The question of unfair notice, then, was not whether
owning a gun was so "innocent" that gun owners "in general" would not fairly appreciate the
likelihood of criminal regulation. The question was instead whether there was a potential for
unfair or arbitrary enforcement ofthe Act given that potential violators must be proven (l) to
have possessed a weapon in the subject class, i.e., a piece of military weaponry, and (2) to have
actually understood that the weapon possessed was a dangerous device likely to be subject to
regulation. Id. at 605. Innocence, with its patina of blamelessness, was not at issue. Id.
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would not be so implausible that a further element of notice-based scienter
should be inferred in the absence of explicit legislative direction.
Yet this is what the Court did in Staples. In an opinion by Justice Thomas,
the Court read the statute to require proof that Mr. Staples knew the particular
characteristics of his rifle which subjected it to the Act's regulation, basing its
holding on the common law presumption of mens rea?62 The Court here
ignored the important difference between common law mens rea rooted in
blameworthiness and the requirement of scienter intended to assure constructive notice in regulatory crimes. The Court's discussion of implied mens rea
instead proceeded on the explicit assumption that the common law presumption
of mens rea applied virtually across the board, citing Balint, Morissette,
Gypsum, and Liparota for this point. 263
If the Court meant to underscore the apparent collapse of the blame/notice
distinction in its mens rea analysis, it could not have chosen four better cases.
Balint, of course, was the case in which the Court had refused to apply the
common law presumption of mens rea in interpreting regulatory crimes (such
as that created by the National Firearms Act) that had no element of scienter on
their face. 264 Morissette, at the other end of the spectrum, was the case in
which the Court reaffrrmed the continuing presumption of mens rea applicable
to codified common law crimes, making clear in its analysis the distinction
between such crimes of blame and crimes of a regulatory nature like the narcotics offense in Balint. 265 While Gypsum marked the careful employment of
notice-based scienter,266 Liparota collapsed the carefully drawn distinction
between notice and blame as a basis for inferring mens rea. 267
Justice Thomas did not go so far as to presume mens rea for all crimes. He
acknowledged that in "limited circumstances,,268 Congress had enacted publicwelfare offenses in which it intended that there be no term of scienter. 269 But
having said that, he went on to note "the particular care we have taken to avoid
construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would
'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. ",270 This concern

262
263

Id. at 605-06.
!d.

See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
266 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
267 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
268 Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437).
269 Staples, 511 U.S. at 606-07.
270Id. at 610 (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426).
264

265
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for criminalizing innocent conduct came from Liparota, which Justice Thomas
noted interpreted the Food Stamp Act to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw
defense "largely because dispensing with such a mens rea requirement would
have resulted in reading the statute to outlaw a number of apparently innocent
acts.,,27I
Of course, prohibiting "innocent" acts, i.e., acts not worthy of moral
condernnation,272 is precisely what regulatory statutes are designed to do. But
after Liparota and its progeny, blameworthiness and innocence form the axis
about which scienter analysis presumptively revolves. 273 The effect, of course,
is to all but do away with serious regulatory crimes.274 So, when Justice

Staples, 511 U.S. at 610.
The Court erased any doubt that by "innocent" it meant "blameless" when in the same
sentence it reaffirmed Liparota's holding that the Food Stamp Act did not in its eyes create a
public welfare offense. Id.
273 This focus on blameworthiness as the principal fountainhead of mens rea continues in
the Court's post-Staples interpretive efforts. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,
269 (2000) ("The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only
that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent
conduct."') (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64,72 (1994) and citing
Staples, 511 U.S. 600). One could argue that the Court's opinion in Arthur Andersen v. United
States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), its most recent foray into the world of mens rea, in part was
founded on notice principles. In Andersen, the Court interpreted the federal obstruction of
justice statute, which forbids "knowingly ... corruptly persuad[ing]" another to destroy documents with the intent to impair their availability at an official proceeding, to require proof that
the accused was "conscious of [his or her] wrongdoing," not just that the accused knew the
nature of the persuasive act. Id. at 706. The Court began its analysis by noting that concerns
for fair warning had informed what the Court characterized as its "traditional[] ... restraint in
assessing the reach of a federai criminal statute," id. at 703 (quoting United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593,600 (1995», and went on to express concern that the act of persuading another to
withhold or even to destroy documents that were relevant to an official proceeding was not
inherently "corrupt," giving as an example advice of counsel to withhold privileged documents
from production in an official proceeding. Andersen, 544 U.S. at 704. However, the Court's
reference to "fair warning" was no more than an implicit reference to the rule ofienity, and its
interpretation of the statutory terms "knowingly ... corrupt[]" to mean "conscious of wrongdoing" is hardly a shift away from blameworthiness as the fulcrum of its mens rea analysis. Id.
at 703, 706. Indeed, as the Court surveyed its interpretive work, it observed, "limiting
criminality to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing sensibly allows [the obstruction statute]
to reach only those with the level of 'culpability ... we usually require in order to impose criminalliability.'" Id. at 706 (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 602).
274 In the concluding section of his scienter analysis, Justice Thomas dwelled at some
length on the harshness of the penalty involved-particularly a ten year prison sentence. Citing
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), he suggested that this fact was virtually
dispositive on the "public welfare status" of the Act and thus on the issue of scienter. Staples,
271
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Thomas in Staples observed that "there can be little doubt that, as in Liparota,
the Government's construction ofthe [Act] potentially would impose criminal
sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state-ignorance of the
characteristics of the weapons in their possession-makes their actions entirely
innocent,,,275 he meant to end the discussion, not to begin it. That regulatory
crime is intended to penalize conduct without relation to blame, leaving only
the question of what notice seems fair in the context of the regulatory need, is a
proposition which the Court seems no longer to accept. 276 Only if the Congress
is explicit, presumably on the face of the statute, about such an intention to

511 U.S. at 616-18. Such a sweeping conclusion is unjustified. To be sure, the Court in
Morissette identified the harshness of punishment as a factor relevant to identifying regulatory
offenses. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248. However, it was but a factor, and one which had its
primary utility in the absence of clearly articulated legislative intent. Id. In other cases, such as
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943), which the Court here ignored, the Court had no difficulty in recognizing the
congressional intent to create a regulatory offense which provided for lengthy imprisonment.
Moreover, the Court in Morissette was speaking in the context of interpreting a statute which
codified a traditional common law crime, a distinction which Justice Thomas again overlooked.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 249.
In the end, the harshness of the penalty is an important factor in attempting to divine
unarticulated legislative intent concerning the quality of notice intended to be assured by a
regulatory crime. The harsher the penalty, the greater the degree of notice intended. But,
contrary to the Court's suggestion, the penalty should not be dispositive.
275 Staples, 511 U.S. at 614-15.
276 Nowhere does the Court make this more clear than in the last paragraph of its principal
scienter analysis, Part II.B of its opinion. There Justice Thomas concluded:
We concur in the Fifth Circuit's conclusion on this point: "It is unthinkable to us that
Congress intended to subject such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible
ten-year term of imprisonment if ... what they genuinely and reasonably believed
was a conventional semiautomatic [weapon] turns out to have worn down into or
been secretly modified to be a fully automatic weapon." As we noted in Morissette,
the "purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent
is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction." We are reluctant to impute that
purpose to Congress where, as here, it would mean easing the path to convicting persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the probability of strict regulation
in the form of a statute such as § 5861 (d).
Id. at 615-16 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Convicting persons of regulatory crimes without proof of mens rea is now "unthinkable."
The Court went on to say in the footnote accompanying the quoted text that "if Congress thinks
it necessary to reduce the Government's burden at trial to ensure proper enforcement of the Act,
it remains free to amend § 5861(d) by explicitly eliminating a mens rea requirement." Id. at616
n.ll. It thus appears that without such explicit textual negation of scienter, serious public
welfare crimes no longer exist.
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penalize without blame does the Court seem willing to recognize it. 277 Even
then, it seems open to question whether the Court is willing to accept a diminished scienter requirement in federal regulatory crime. Such a revolution in the
interpretation of criminal statutes, undoing a conceptual framework which took
more than fifty years fully to evolve, seems well beyond what Congress intended. It is thus particularly ironic that the Court claimed as its mandate in Staples
the interpretation of congressional intent. 278
THE DOCTRINAL EPILOG

What has emerged as the lower courts confront this "vexatious problem,,279
of mens rea in federal criminal statutes after Liparota, RatzlaJand Staples is a
wooden and sometimes distorted analytic construct. Gone is the possibility of
openly notice-based analysis in considering whether a regulatory statute
implicitly provides for some level of mens rea or in determining the reach and
meaning of a mens rea term in such a statute. In its place is a set of seemingly
inflexible principles that govern the courts' interpretive efforts in this regard.
First, RatzlaJappears to have opened the door to, if not quite mandated, the
interpretation of "willfully" to provide for an ignorance-of-the-Iaw defense?SO

277 So, the Court concluded its opinion in Staples with the observation that "our holding
depends critically on our view that if Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners
who were wholly ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, and to subject them
to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that effect." Id. at 620 (citation
omitted).
278 The Court's full commitment to the merger of notice and blame in its scienter analysis
continued in Posters 'N' Things Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994), and United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), although perhaps not as blatantly as in Staples. In
both Posters 'N' Things and X-Citement Videos, the Court was asked to determine the level of
scienter required by a regulatory or public welfare statute, and in both the Court began with the
presumption that scienter was required, the only question being what kind. Posters 'N'Things,
511 U.S. at 517-18; X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. In both, there was a strong argument for
a narrowly crafted or narrowly based scienter requirement, but in both the Court took the
broader presumptive path staked out in Liparota and Staples. Posters 'N' Things, 511 U.S. at
526; X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72.
279 United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82,83 (2d Cir. 2000).
280 See generally Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence o/Willfulness: An Evolving Theory
o/Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKEL.J. 341-42 (1998). Butc! Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.
184, 193-95 (1998) (holding that to prove "willful" violation ofthe federal statute forbidding
the unlicensed sale of firearms the Government need only prove that the defendant knew that his
conduct was unlawful, not that he further knew of the specific law that he violated, i.e., the law
requiring a license to sell). While Bryan hardly marks a full restoration of the ignorance-of -thelaw doctrine, it distinguishes Ratzla/s reading of "willful," id. at 194-99, and marks a step back
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There is, of course, the potential for predictability in this interpretive command,
although its reach is still far from clear. When coupled with the Court's refusal
in International Minerals to read "knowingly violate any such regulation" to
provide for a mistake-of-Iaw defense,28t this provides a relatively clear
demarcation, notwithstanding the contrary holding of Liparota. Absent very
explicit indications in the legislative history, courts have declined to read
"knowingly" as a specific-intent provision providing for a mistake-of-Iaw defense, reserving that meaning for "willfully. ,,282 Although it may not well serve
from the general application of the "ignorance-of-this-specific-Iaw" defense suggested by
RatzlaJand its interpretation of "willful."
Courts of appeals have picked up on this distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Bursey,
416 F.3d 301, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that "willfully" as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ I 752(a)(I )(ii) (2000), punishing one who enters or remains in a restricted area where the
President is visiting, requires proof only that the offender knew that his conduct was unlawful
but not that he knew of the particular statute or regulation that forbade his conduct); United
States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "willfully" as used in 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (current version at Pub. L. No. 109-248, title I, § 141(c), 120 Stat. 603
(2006», punishing the making of a false statement to a federal agent, required at most proof that
the accused knew that his conduct was unlawful, and further suggesting even that proof may not
be required); United States v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting
"willfully" as used in 43 U.S.C. § 1733(a), the statute punishing violations of the Bureau of
Land Management regulations, to require proof that the offending conduct was unlawful but
reserving on whether there must be further proof that the offender must know of the regulation
in question).
Even before Bryan's apparent pruning of Ratzlafs reach, there were circuit courts that, in
spite of Ratzlaf, resisted interpreting "willfully" to require proof of knowledge that the conduct
was unlawful, at least in crimes that had long been interpreted to require no such proof See,
e.g., United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831-32 (4thCir. 1995), vacated on other grounds,
516 U.S. 984 (1995) (holding that ''willfully'' as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), punishing
false statements to a federal agent, required proof that the accused knew that the statement was
false but not that such an act was unlawful); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040,
1048 n.21 (5th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (dictum) (same).
281 United States v. Int'I Minerals, 402 U.S. 558,560, 563 (1971). See supra pp. 37-39.
282 See, e.g., United States v. Pasillas-Gaytan, 192 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1999) (so
interpreting 18 U.S.C .. § 1546(a) (1996) (current version at Pub. L. No. 107-273, div. B, title
IV, § 4002(a)(3), 116 Stat. 1806 (2002» forbidding unlawful procurement of immigration);
United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 438 (6th Cir. 1998) (so
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1986) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)
(2000», the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); United States v. Sinskey, 119
F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (so interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A), the Federal Clean
Water Act); United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) (so interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(I)(A) (invalidated by U.S. v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 405 (6th Cir. 2005»,
forbidding willfully dealing firearms without a license).
As noted above, four years after Ratzlaf, the Court in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184
(1998) endorsed this dichotomy. In Bryan, the Court was called on to interpret "willfully" as
used in the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, which as noted it held to require proof that a
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the intentions of Congress with respect to the meaning of the substantial number of statutes in which "willfully" appears, it at least serves as clear guidance
to congressional drafters for future regulatory statutes. If one intends to provide
for a mistake-of-Iaw defense (or at least to leave the door open), use
"willfully;,,283 if not, use "knowingly."
The impact of Staples is more pernicious. Its only apparent benefit is for
those who, as a normative matter, disapprove of strict criminalliability?84 The
Court's holding serves as an imperfect proxy for the due process requirement of
mens rea that the Court refused to find in Balint and that many commentators
hoped could be read into Lambert. 285 If one takes the view that mens rea, as a
matter of substantive due process, should be a part of every serious crime, say
every felony, Staples comes pretty close to that result, albeit on statutory not
constitutional grounds. Its mandate, as read by the lower courts, seems clear,
uncomplicated by any interest balancing which should attend notice analysis.
Except for a limited class of "public welfare" crimes, Morissette's traditional
presumption of mens rea applies to all crimes, requiring scienter for those
elements that criminalize otherwise "innocent conduct. ,,286 As to the "limited"

person selling a gun without a permit knew that his conduct was unlawful (but not specifically
that a permit was required), and so it is not clear that its observation concerning the meaning of
"knowingly" constitutes a holding as such. Id. at 193. But the line that the Court drew between
the two terms could not have been more clear. In its words,
unless the text of the statue dictates a different result, the term "knowingly" merely
requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.... More is required, however, ... [for] "willfully." The jury must find that the defendant acted
with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.
Id. (citations omitted). In a footnote and without illumination, the Court treated Liparota as a
case in which the statutory text dictated the expansion of "knowingly" to include knowledge
that the conduct was unlawful. Id. at 193 n.15.
283 But see supra note 280, citing a sampling of cases in courts that have declined to read
''willfully'' to provide for a mistake-of-law defense.
284 See, e.g., supra note 53. See also Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law
of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2004); Kennedy, supra note 52; Richard
Singer & Douglas Husak, OfInnocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since
Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 859 (1999).
285 See supra note 118.
286 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,426 (1985) ("This construction [requiring
proof that the accused knew that his sale of food stamps was unauthorized] is particularly
appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute otherwise would be to crirninalize a broad
range of innocent conduct."); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1994) ("Here,
there can be little doubt that, as in Liparota, the Government's construction of the statute
potentially would impose criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state--
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class of public welfare crimes not subject to this presumption of mens rea, the
operative assumption seems to be that they are intended to be crimes of strict
liability.287 There is in this duality no room for mens rea as an instrument of
notice. Scienter either automatically flows from the blame-based presumption
of Morissette, even if the concern for criminalizing "otherwise innocent conduct" is one of notice, or it disappears altogether into the black hole of strict
liability. To say the least, this all-or-nothing approach is a blunt instrument to
deal with the conflicting interests that are implicated in typical notice analysis,
and many of the cases struggling to adapt this inapt tool to the often complex
interpretive task in question illustrate the analytic distortions that can result.
Take, for example, United States v. Ahmad/88 a case in which the Fifth
Circuit reviewed a conviction of a gas station owner under the Clean Water Act
for dumping several thousand gallons of gasoline and gasolirie-contaminated
water into a storm sewer.289 The Act provides that it is a felony to "knowingly"
violate of any of its sections, one of which forbids the discharge, without a
permit, of a pollutant into navigable water of the United States.z90 Ahmad
sought to defend by claiming that he thought what he was dumping into the
ignorance of the characteristics of weapons in their possession-makes them entirely innocent.") (footnote omitted).
287 The Court in Staples was unclear in this regard, and as seen below, some lower courts
have read it to permit some mistake or ignorance-of-fact defenses. See, e.g., United States v.
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Staples for the proposition that "[e]ven under
this public welfare doctrine, however, true or rigid strict liability does not generally follow, as
ignorance of the facts usually remains a defense"). The genesis ofthis notion is a footnote in
Staples conceding, and explaining away, the Court's earlier observation in International
Minerals that so-called public welfare offenses generally are thought "to require at least that the
defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous or deleterious substance" and thus that
the Court has "avoided construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict liability."
Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 n.3. The Court went on to observe, in the same footnote:
[W]e have referred to public welfare offenses as "dispensing with" or "eliminating" a
mens rea requirement or "mental element" [citing Morissette and Dotterweich] and
have described them as strict liability crimes [citing Gypsum]. While use of the term
"strict liability" is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the requirement of
a "guilty mind" with respect to an element of a crime. Under such statutes we have
not required that the defendant know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition
of the offense.
Id. This language is hardly a firm basis for saying, as does the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, that in
public welfare offenses "ignorance of the facts usually remains a defense," and most courts have
not so read it. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 165 F .3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998).
288 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).
289Id. at 388.
290Id.

2007-2008]

MENS REA AND REGULATORY CRIME

67

sewer was water, not gasoline. 291 Such a mistake-of-fact defense would only be
cognizable if the Act requires proof that he was aware of the nature of his
discharge. 292
The government predictably argued that the Clean Water Act is a regulatory crime and that as such all that was required to satisfy the knowledge
element was proof that Ahmad knew he was discharging something into the
sewer (as opposed to an accidental discharge). The Fifth Circuit conceded that
the Act "[o]n its face ... does appear to implicate public welfare. ,,293 However,
apparently concerned about the prospect of strict felony liability, the court
resisted this categorization of the Act, citing Staples for the ostensible clarifycation that "[public welfare] offenses involve statutes that regulate potentially
harmful or injurious items,,,294 and then observing that, although gasoline seems
"potentially harmful or injurious," it is "certainly no more so than machine
guns.,,295 With the escape hatch thus open, the court returned to Staples for the
"key to public welfare offense analysis," that being "whether' dispensing with
mens rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally
lawful conduct, ",296 i.e., the "innocent conduct" concern. The court applied
this test to Ahmad's case, finding that it was satisfied because, without proof
that Ahmad knew that he was discharging a pollutant, he (and others like him)
could be convicted of a felony for pumping what he believed to be water into
the sewer. So, the court held that the Clean Water Act is not a public welfare
offense-at least insofar as it forbids discharging pollutants into navigable
water without a permit-and thus the "usual presumption of a mens rea requirement applies.,,297
However defensible this result may be, or may feel, the logic is tortured.
Reduced to its essentials, the reasoning is purely instrumental. The Fifth Circuit ignored what it conceded to be so--that the Clean Water Act is quin-

at 388-89.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.

291 Id.
292
293

294Id.
295Id.
296Id. See also United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000)
(taking a similar "innocent-conduct" approach in deciding that the statute in question, there the
Lacey Act, which forbids permitting wild animals to be transported into the United States under
inhumane or unhealthy conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1952)) (current version at Pub. L. No.
104-332, § 2(h)(I), 110 Stat. 4091 (1996)), requires proof that the accused knew of the offending conditions under which the animals were being transported).
297 I d.
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tessentially a regulatory crime designed to protect the public from potentially
hazardous substances. Instead, the court first decided whether it is possible that
the applicability of the statute could surprise a person who, like Ahmad, had
done what the statute prohibited; that is, does the statute raise a potential notice
concern? If that possibility exists (as the Fifth Circuit found to be so in
Ahmad), then it might be necessary to infer-as a matter oflegislative intentsome element of knowledge (in Ahmad, knowledge of what he discharged) to
address that notice concern. In a pre-Staples world, the analysis should then
balance this concern for notice against any apparent need for excuse-free
enforcement; the regulatory or "public welfare" concern underlying the statute
would be but a factor in the balancing. However, if Staples means what it says,
once a statute is deemed to be regulatory, the inquiry is effectively over. A
mens rea element is only possible (but is virtually automatic) if the statute is
not regulatory, not a crime of "public welfare." So, to address its concern for
notice, the Fifth Circuit did what it had to, and held that the Clean Water Act is
not a public welfare, regulatory crime but instead a traditional crime, subject to
the "usual" presumption of mens rea. 298
If the court had felt free to recognize the statute's regulatory character and
then to further consider the notice issue in light of the statute's text, legislative
history, and purpose, weighing the congressional concerns for full enforcement
of this important environmental legislation against the concerns relating to its

298 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 ("Following Staples, we hold that the offenses charged in
counts one and two are not public welfare offenses and that the usual presumption of a mens rea
requirement applies. With the exception of purely jurisdictional elements, the mens rea of
knowledge applies to each element of the crimes."). As noted, the Fifth Circuit's analysis was
focused on the notice concern of a criminal statute reaching the conduct of one who might be
unfairly surprised that his conduct was potentially criminal. As developed above, the traditional
blame-based presumption of mens rea is an inapt way to respond to this concern.
There may be, however, a different argument that would provide a better conceptual fit, at
least to this crime. Although enacted as part ofa comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Act's
prohibition against dumping a pollutant, here gasoline or gasoline-contaminated water, into the
nation's water supply may be seen as a consensus norm in our increasingly environmentally
conscious society. See HALL, supra note 3, at 340-41 (arguing that the common law mala in
selmala prohibita distinction is an artificial, inflexible guide in determining whether or not mens
rea is an element of a crime). If that were so, it might be fair to treat it as a crime imbued with
blame, one which is thus subject to the traditional presumption articulated in Morissette. Put
another way, if the judgment of society---expressed in this statute-is that one who empties the
polluted contents of his gasoline-storage tank into our water is not just a businessman who
violated federal regulations but rather a morally blameworthy person subject to the formal
societal censure of a criminal conviction, it is appropriate to require proof of sufficient mens rea
to merit the judgment of blame that flows from such a conviction.
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potential unfairness to those to whom it might apply, the result might well have
been the same. Maybe the Fifth Circuit considered those factors in deciding
this case; maybe not. We will never know, but what we do know is that its
reasoning is thin cover for its apparent goal.
Other courts have avoided this analytic trap by reading a little more leeway
into the doctrinal construct that emerged from Staples. In United States v.
Lynch/99 the case involving the skull finder prosecuted under the Archaeological Resource Protection Act discussed at the outset,300 the Ninth Circuit
side-stepped the question of whether the statute was a public welfare measure,
opining that the defendant's conduct, picking up a human skull, was as a
categorical matter neither an act that was malum in se nor one that involved
public welfare. 3ot Putting aside whether the defendant's conduct is an
appropriate measure of the statute's character, the court at least freed itself from
the constraints of Staples's public welfare/traditional-crime duality and thus felt
able to address its concern that ARPA might tum a casual souvenir collector
such as Lynch into an unwitting felon. It addressed this fair-warning concern
by resort to the traditional, blame-based presumption in favor of mens rea; the
court had no occasion under this approach to consider the possibility that
Congress intended strict, excuse-free enforcement of the statute to advance the
important societal interest of protecting archaeological treasures?02 Again, this
might be the right result under a full notice analysis, but any consideration of
the government's interest in excuse-free enforcement (and there was evidence
of just such a concern in ARPA's legislative history) and the attendant
balancing of that interest against the perceived potential for unfairness occurred
behind the judicial curtain; Staples and its progeny leave no room for openly
notice-based mens rea.
If the Ninth Circuit in Lynch avoided pigeon-holing ARPA as either a
public welfare or a traditional crime and thus avoided the government's
argument that "knowingly" did not reach the element in question, the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Wilson 303 took a more head-on approach, reading
International Minerals and Staples to allow for a mistake-of-fact defense even
in public welfare crimes. 304 To say the least, this overreads Staples. 305 The

233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
See supra pp. 3-5.
301 Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1143.
3021d. at 1144-46.
303
133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
304 ld. at 263.
299

300

70

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

basis for this assertion is a footnote in Staples in which Justice Thomas
conceded, and explained away, the Court's earlier observation in International
Minerals that so-called public welfare offenses generally are thought "to
require at least that the defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous
or deleterious substance.,,306 As Justice Thomas explained it, this passage was
meant to guard against imposing absolute liability, but he continued in the same
footnote:
Nevertheless, we have referred to public welfare offenses as "dispensing
with" or "eliminating" a mens rea requirement or "mental element" and have
described them as strict liability crimes. While the use of the term "strict
liability" is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the
requirement of a "guilty mind" with respect to an element of a crime. Under
such statutes we have not required that the defendant know the facts that
307
make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.

This language hardly justifies the Fourth Circuit's broad assertion in
Wi/son that in public welfare offenses "ignorance of the facts usually remains a
defense,,,308 and most courts have not so read it. 309 One cannot help but think
that this overstatement had more to do with the Fourth Circuit's recognition
that the Clean Water Act, there at issue, is undeniably a regulatory statutealong with its disinclination to impose strict liability-than the court's inability
to fairly read Staples. But this is the box in which courts find themselves.
An even more disquieting interpretive development-at least for those
committed to some semblance of interpretive consistency-are cases suggesting
that statutes can, like a chameleon, change their character depending on their
application. Thus, courts have held that the same statute can in some applications be public welfare-and thus impose strict liability-and in others be
traditional, subject to the presumption of mens rea. This is another legacy of
Staples, which without explanation held that the National Firearms Act when
applied to machine guns (an enumerated "firearm" the unregistered possession

305 See supra notes 268~9, 277. To be sure, the crimes that Justice Thomas in Staples
seemed willing to recognize as "public welfare," and thus as a crime that provided for criminal
punishment without proof of mens rea, seemed quite narrow. But it is this false dichotomy of
presumptive, blame-based mens rea for all crimes except for this narrow category of public
welfare crimes that lies at the bottom of Staples.
306 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,607 n.3 (1994).
307 I d. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) and United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978)).
308 Wilson, 133 F.3d at 263.
309 See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998).
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of which was forbidden by the Act) was not a public welfare measure while
conceding that when applied to hand grenades (another enumerated "fIrearm"
and the subject of the Court's opinion in Freed) was a public welfare measure.
The idea that the very same statutory term-here "firearm"-in the very same
statute can have a different character and thus a different mens rea requirement
depending on the particular "firearm" to which it is applied is at least curious,
even recognizing that the term "firearm" is not under the statute one weapon
but a list of several. But courts unenthusiastic about reading a mistake defense
into this regulatory statute, at least as applied to weaponry which is facially "not
innocent," have resorted to this way around the Staples dictate. So, the Eighth
Circuit most recently in United States v. ErharPlo and the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Imes311 held that the Firearms Act as applied to a sawed-off
shotgun (like machine guns and hand grenades, an enumerated "firearm" under
the Act) does not require proof that a possessor knew that it had the characteristics which caused it to be deemed a "firearm," that is, an overall length ofless
than twenty-six inches or a barrel length less than eighteen inches. Other circuits, although presumably no more enthusiastic about allowing a mistake-offact defense in such cases, have felt bound by Staples's holding and held that
the government must prove knowledge of these defining characteristics. 312
One cannot help but think that such a cavalier disregard of Supreme Court
precedent as demonstrated in Erhart and Imes is to some measure the result of
the Court's willingness to disregard its own teachings and to impose its overly
simplistic, presumptive construct on the federal courts as they work to discern
the will of Congress in interpreting the ever growing body of regulatory criminal statutes. To be sure, there are still cases in which the lower courts struggle
to stay within the teachings of the Court and yet preserve a meaningful
distinction between traditional crime and regulatory crime.313 However, even in

310

415 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2005).
80 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1996).
312 See United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1229 (lOth Cir. 1994); United States v.
Starkes, 32 F.3d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1994).
313 See, e.g., United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147-51 (2d Cir. 2001)(interpreting
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2000», to require proof only that the accused knew that
he was dealing with asbestos, but not that the asbestos was of the kind or quantity that would
trigger the regulatory workplace standard); United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d Ill, 115-16 (2d
Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Alien Re-Entry Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1996) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1327 (2000» to require proof that the accused knew that the alien whose entry he had
facilitated was legally excludable from the United States). Even here, the analysis is crimped,
the respective courts being forced by Supreme Court precedent largely to forego a full notice
analysis.
311
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these cases, the courts find themselves hamstrung, unable to escape the Court's
short-circuiting of the notice analysis.
If one is of the view that mens rea is an essential predicate to all criminal
punishment, then Liparota, Staples, and RatzlaJare more than half of the loaf.
Although liability without fault still survives, the Court's adoption of "innocent
conduct" as the principal, if not sole, criterion of statutory construction
regarding mens rea goes a long way towards eliminating federal strict-liability
crimes. Maybe in this era of often draconian sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this development is a good thing. 314 But the possibility that
in a particular instance Congress might opt for an excuse-free criminal sanction
to protect the public from what it sees as a substantial threat to public safety is
effectively lost in this jurisprudence. The Court has simply erected a mens rea
construct that no longer permits that legislative judgment to take effect,
effectively imposing its will over that of Congress, all in the name of statutory
construction. At least from the perspective of the democratic process and
legislative prerogative, that does not seem to be an altogether good thing.

314

See generally Kennedy, supra note 52.

